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Abstract 
 
My thesis forms a critical examination of Adorno’s treatment of the idea of 
freedom. I claim that, despite the pessimism of Adorno’s views concerning the 
unfreedom of the individual in contemporary society, he nonetheless offers a 
novel way of thinking about the possibilities of both individual and social 
freedom. In particular, I focus on his suggestion that impulses play an integral 
part in our experience of freedom, and I seek to show the way in which this 
relates to Adorno’s moral philosophy. I end with a consideration of how we 
should read his claims pertaining to the realisation of a wider social freedom. 
Throughout my examination, I identify aspects of Adorno’s account that are 
less feasible than others, and how, if at all, Adorno could meet any objections. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
‘Reflections on freedom and determinism sound archaic, as though dating back 
from the early times of the revolutionary bourgeoise. But that freedom grows 
obsolete without having been realised – this is a fatality not to be accepted; it is a 
fatality which resistance must clarify.’1 
 
 
This passage reveals several fundamental aspects of Adorno’s examination of the 
idea of freedom. By suggesting that reflections on freedom appear to us as 
somehow archaic, Adorno at once puts in to doubt the value of discussing freedom 
at all. The idea is that, while the question of freedom might have been au courant 
in previous centuries, it is of little significance in contemporary society. This 
might be because freedom has either been instantiated, and therefore that there is 
no point in devoting theoretical energy to contemplating it, or, alternatively, that 
the realisation of freedom has become such a dim prospect that we may as well 
give up on thinking about it altogether. Given that Adorno goes on to say that 
‘freedom grows obsolete’, it is clear that he does not think that the idea of freedom 
has been realised in actuality. But Adorno then claims that ‘resistance’ must 
clarify the reasons why freedom grows obsolete. The idea that freedom grows 
obsolete suggests a process, and perhaps one that is reversible. Secondly, the 
statement entails that we cannot comfortably dismiss the question of freedom as 
one that is somehow outmoded. In this passage, then, Adorno simultaneously 
alerts the reader to the possibility that the question of freedom might appear to us 
to have become of little significance in contemporary society whilst urging us to 
continue to reflect on it. 
 
Many questions arise from this passage, not least, the question of how it is that 
Adorno can conceivably think that the idea of freedom has grown obsolete without 
being realised. In actual fact, there are two parts to this question. The first is what 
does Adorno think freedom is such that we can say of it that it has not been 
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realised or that it is obsolete? The second is what does Adorno hold to have 
occurred in the world such that it makes sense to talk of whatever we mean by 
freedom becoming obsolete? In other words, what is it about contemporary society 
that Adorno thinks could render freedom obsolete? Whilst the two questions are 
inextricably linked to one another, this work will principally seek to answer the 
first question, and not attempt to answer the second which necessitates an 
independent analysis. But, in order to make some sense of Adorno’s treatment of 
freedom, I will give a crude sketch of Adorno’s views concerning contemporary 
society. 
 
Thus, in Minima Moralia, Adorno famously claims that ‘Wrong life cannot be 
lived rightly’ and that ‘The Whole is the false.’2 This is because he thinks that, as a 
result of certain propensities in human thought and the historical developments 
that have arisen as a result of these tendencies, the social world has become 
entirely corrupted. Society no longer provides the conditions under which a 
meaningful or ethical existence can be had. Importantly, the second claim is an 
inversion of Hegel’s famous claim that the truth is the whole, in which ‘truth’ has 
both an evaluative and an epistemic function. For Hegel, therefore, the ‘whole is 
true’ because we can conceive of how things ought to be, and the totality is a 
perfect instantiation of this conception. Adorno thinks that, contra Hegel, 
contemporary society itself is radically evil and irrational, and, given the degree of 
our implication in the insidious mechanisms of contemporary social life, we 
cannot even begin to conceive of how things ought to be. Society is in fact a 
totality which obscures its own basic functioning, and any claim to objective 
knowledge on the part of the individual is a sign of reified consciousness.3 
 
This is in part the result of the human proclivity throughout history to seek to 
dominate nature and other men, and the kind of thought that accompanies forms of 
domination; that is, what Adorno refers to as ‘identity-thinking’, in which we 
subsume particular instances of phenomena under general concepts and come to 
view everything as though it is in some sense interchangeable. Adorno holds that 
the horror of much modern history, in particular, events such as the Holocaust, are 
not aberrations but are themselves the culmination of these forms of thought. 
Processes such as commodification and the capitalist system of exchange are also 
based on a model by which that which is non-identical is regarded as identical, and 
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individuals come to be viewed as abstract entities that are interchangeable. The 
individual comes to be entirely subsumed under the totalising system, in which no 
sphere of life is left untouched. The individual becomes only a function of the 
economy, and goods come to be produced independently of their use value and 
satisfy desires ‘only very indirectly.’4 The supposed freedom that the individual 
possesses remains only ‘part of the cherished private life’5, which is itself subject 
to the homogenising aspects of the whole.  
 
Given the bleakness of Adorno’s views concerning the present condition of 
society, and the extent of our own unfreedom, we might well ask why freedom 
remains something that we can meaningfully discuss at all. After all, according to 
Adorno, we live in an age of ‘universal social repression’6 in which individuals are 
‘merely appendages’ in the process of production.7 There are several answers as to 
why Adorno thinks that it is meaningful – and in fact, necessary – to continue to 
talk about freedom. Firstly, Adorno holds there to be a ‘genuine possibility’ of 
freedom in contemporary society.8 It is thus not to be dismissed precisely because 
it remains something that can be realised. Secondly, morality hinges on the 
question of freedom, and, while Adorno might think that we cannot live an 
ethically good life in society, this does not entail that he thinks that questions of 
right and wrong should not be entertained. If anything, this is exactly the moment 
at which we ought to do our utmost to engage with questions of moral philosophy. 
Finally, Adorno also thinks that individuals in contemporary society are constantly 
being told that they are free when they are in fact not free at all.9 An examination 
of the way in which we think of freedom, then, might enable us to begin to 
distinguish between the false freedom that we are accorded as economic subjects, 
and the kind of self-experience that might actually lead to some form of free 
agency. It is also worth noting that some of Adorno’s strongest and arguably less 
convincing claims are intentional exaggerations that he conceives of as ways of 
momentarily breaking through false consciousness. These kinds of claim point to 
the truth, but are not to be taken literally. 
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My intention in this thesis, then, is to show that, despite Adorno’s more negative 
claims concerning the unfreedom of contemporary society, he does in fact offer an 
important and novel account of freedom. In order to do this, I will seek to answer 
three questions. Firstly, how plausible is Adorno’s conception of the self-
experience of freedom? Secondly, how does Adorno’s account of the self-
experience of freedom relate to moral action? Finally, does Adorno make any 
suggestions as to the changes that would have to occur in order that social freedom 
could be achieved? I will argue that Adorno’s re-orients the concept of freedom 
away from more traditional models via the notion of the impulse that he thinks 
moves us to action. I go on to defend the notion of the ‘additional factor’ against 
several objections. I then seek to clarify the relation that holds between self-
experience of freedom and aspects of Adorno’s moral philosophy, and analyse 
how successfully the notion of the impulse can be deployed in these contexts. 
Finally, I will argue that Adorno does provide some suggestions as to what social 
changes would have to occur such that some form of social freedom can be 
realised. Thus, the thesis is largely constructive in that I seek to show how Adorno 
can be read such that he provides coherent answers to all three questions. 
However, there are certain aspects of his treatment of freedom that are less 
feasible than others, and along the way I will identify what these may be, and how, 
if at all, Adorno could meet them. Of course, Adorno is famously anti-systematic, 
and at no point seeks to arrive at a theory of freedom. But this does not mean that 
Adorno’s claims concerning freedom cannot be evaluated or analysed, or 
understood in relation to other aspects of his thought. Adorno himself talks of the 
possibility – and desirability – of identifying the permanent components of 
concepts whilst remaining sensitive to the way in which they are liable to 
change.10 What Adorno deems problematic is the search for straightforward 
solutions to questions of the freedom of the will and the problem of freedom in 
society.11 
 
There are two distinct approaches that can be taken in examining Adorno’s model 
of freedom. The first is to focus on Adorno’s idea that real freedom would require  
reconciliation. The second is to examine what could be regarded as his agent-
centred account of freedom.  Whilst neither idea can be satisfactorily examined in 
isolation from the other, this thesis is principally concerned with Adorno’s account 
of freedom as it relates to the individual agent. Ostensibly, this might seem 
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puzzling. After all, Adorno holds that it does not make sense to think about 
freedom only on an individual level, which as will be discussed, is a criticism that 
he levels at Kant’s theory of freedom. Like both Hegel and Marx, Adorno holds 
that individual freedom could only be achieved in a society in which all of its 
members are free. In ‘History and Freedom’ he states: 
 
‘Freedom can only ever be defined in [social] contexts or, depending on 
circumstances, as freedom from them. We may also express it by saying that, 
without the freedom of the species…there is no such thing as individual 
freedom.’12 
 
Thus, according to Adorno, to talk of freedom only on an individual level amounts 
to little more than an abstraction from the actual empirical conditions that either 
allow or deny the subject freedom. However, while this is the case, Adorno in fact 
says very little about what societal freedom would look like. This is because he 
thinks that, as a result of the way in which society has developed, it is almost 
impossible from our present vantage point to say anything at all about what real 
freedom would be. It is therefore difficult to extract anything substantial from the 
notion that freedom would consist in reconciliation, and attempts at understanding 
the idea remain speculative. However, in the last chapter I will consider several 
passages found in the lectures ‘History and Freedom’ and examine how they might 
be understood. 
 
On the other hand, Adorno’s discussion of the self-experience of freedom is lucid 
and detailed. This is in part because he thinks that social freedom itself can only be 
discussed from the point of view of the freedom of individuals in a particular 
society as it is they who are in fact the ‘touchstone’ of freedom.13 In fact, in both 
Negative Dialectics and his lectures ‘History and Freedom’, Adorno devotes 
considerable attention to outlining what the self-experience of freedom might 
consist in. In a society in which the causes of unfreedom are obscured, we cannot 
simply hope to make sense of what freedom might be by looking at existing social 
structures. It is the individual in contemporary society that is the locus of wider 
societal tendencies, and by examining subjective experience we can begin to gain 
access to wider societal tendencies: 
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‘He who wishes to know the  truth about life in its immediacy must scrutinise its 
estranged form, the objective powers that determine individual existence even in 
its most hidden recesses.’14 
 
The idea is that, by examining the ways in which the subject can be said to be free 
or unfree, it might be possible to begin to understand the ways in which society as 
a whole prevents or allows for freedom. In the dedication Adorno also warns 
against the ‘large historical categories’, as they are themselves borne out of – and 
reproduce – the nefarious elements of the social totality. What is problematic is 
when we start to treat concepts such as freedom, equality, and justice as if they are 
permanent concepts with unchanging features that can be spoken of removed from 
the relations that hold between the particular and the universal. Thus, while it is 
true that actual freedom would require a form of societal reconciliation, in the 
present conditions in which we live, such freedom is neither realisable nor 
conceivable. However, in the meantime, we can start to think of how something 
like freedom might be available to the subject experientially.  
 
It is important also to briefly outline the way in which Adorno’s model is situated 
in relation to other kinds of approaches to the question of freedom. There are two 
questions that might structure such an inquiry. First, how does Adorno’s model 
relate to other thinkers in the history of philosophy who arrived at a theory of 
freedom? Second, what aspects of the philosophical question of freedom does 
Adorno himself seek to answer? After all, the notion of freedom is broad, and we 
may wish to distinguish between on the one hand the metaphysical concern with 
freedom of the will, and on the other hand the question of what constitutes moral 
or political freedom. 
 
First, Adorno’s conception of freedom cannot be removed from a consideration of 
the Hegelian critique of Kantian freedom. As Bowie points out, the principal 
conceptual framework from which Adorno’s discussion of freedom derives is 
precisely the tension arising between the Kantian and Hegelian conception of 
freedom and moral agency.15 While the first chapter will examine two aspects of 
Adorno’s critique of Kant’s notion of freedom,  this should not lead us to the 
conclusion that Adorno is a proponent of Hegel’s theory of freedom . Thus, in 
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order to frame Adorno’s model of freedom, it is useful to briefly examine Hegel’s 
critique of Kantian freedom.  
 
For Kant, the exercise of autonomy on the part of the subject requires both 
freedom from the laws of nature and the agent giving itself practical laws in 
accordance with reason. He states that: “Autonomy of the will is the property the 
will has of being a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of 
volition).”16 Thus, autonomy – and therefore, moral agency – requires that the 
individual is capable of rationally reflecting on their actions and thereby being 
able to give reasons for them. Whilst Hegel accepts that freedom requires 
rationality on the part of the individual, he famously accuses Kant of ‘empty 
formalism’. For Hegel, Kant’s conception of self-determination wrongly suggests 
that these sorts of reasons are available to the subject removed from the particular 
context in which he finds himself. By contrast, Hegel argues that the agent 
chooses in a given environment, the latter of which contains various pre-existing 
norms and commitments that themselves provide the framework for the individual 
subject’s reflections and rational deliberations. Thus, for Hegel, freedom is in fact 
actualised through the various commitments and obligations that occur through 
partaking in Sittlichkeit. Sittlichkeit denotes the sphere in which one leads one’s 
ethical life through assuming a social role within an institutional framework. In 
order to lead an ethically good life, the individual must fulfil their allotted role, 
and by so doing, involve themselves in the rational structure underlying society. 
Yet Hegel makes a further claim; that is, that freedom is in fact something that is 
realised in history and, moreover, in the society of his day. Adorno characterises 
the Hegelian intertwining of freedom and history in the following way: 
 
‘History becomes a radical movement in the direction of freedom. ‘Consciousness 
of freedom’ does not refer to an individual, subjective consciousness of freedom, 
but to the spirit that objectively realises itself through history, thus making 
freedom a reality.’17  
 
As will be discussed in chapter one, Adorno follows Hegel’s criticism of Kant‘s 
view that freedom is a subjective quality possessed simply by virtue of the 
possession of an abstracted reason. Yet this does not mean that Adorno thinks that 
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anything like freedom is available in our current ethical life, or that it is something 
that is necessarily realised historically. In the second and third chapter I will 
examine why it is that Adorno thinks that the idea of freedom as something that is 
realised by an agent’s involvement in the institutions of modern societies does not 
provide a suitable alternative to the Kantian picture.  
 
It is important that Adorno’s project should also be situated in relation to questions 
that continue to arise in philosophical discourse on freedom. In particular, we 
might wish to know whether Adorno believes in free will, or whether he is a 
determinist. In fact, as will be discussed in the first chapter, Adorno contentiously 
claims that this question is, if not irrelevant, certainly not the only one of 
importance, and furthermore, that this form of approach can lead to an obfuscation 
of what  is really at stake when we talk about freedom. By extension, 
contemporary debates between compatibilists and incompatibilists on the question 
of whether or not we can be free and consequently morally responsible whilst 
subject to the deterministic laws of nature have little to do with what Adorno 
thinks should be the chief source of reflections on freedom. We can begin to gain a 
clearer understanding of what Adorno does think  should be the starting-point of 
reflections on freedom from a passage found in the first lecture of ‘History and 
Freedom’; 
 
‘Objectively, such a progress [towards freedom] is impossible because of the 
increasingly dense texture of society in both East and West; the growing 
concentration of the economy, the executive and the bureaucracy has advanced to 
such an extent that people are reduced more and more to the status of 
functions…Goods are not produced for their own sake and their consumption 
satisfies people’s own desires only very indirectly and to a very limited extent.’18 
 
What this passage might prompt us to think is that focusing only on the question 
of whether or not we can be free whilst being determined by the laws of nature 
wrongly ignores the real social conditions that in fact determine us. This passage 
might lead to a further question. That is, should we understand Adorno as being 
principally concerned with political freedom, or with the metaphysical question of 
the freedom of the will? As I mentioned, a large part of this thesis will be an 
examination of Adorno’s response to Kant’s account of willing. But the above 
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passage might suggest to us that Adorno’s principal concern is not so much the 
question of what constitutes freedom of the will but a more concrete inquiry in to 
the actual socio-economic conditions that hold under late capitalism. In fact, it is 
one of Adorno’s strengths that he thinks that the two questions are inextricably 
linked, and that it does not make sense to posit them as separate issues. In many 
ways the aim of this thesis is to attempt to understand and show that such a way of 
proceeding should not be viewed as a conflation of two separate philosophical 
problems, but rather the way in which we should properly think about freedom. 
 
Thus, to briefly outline the structure of thesis, in the first chapter, I examine two 
aspects of Adorno’s critique of Kant with a view to establishing a set of 
constraints on Adorno’s own conception of freedom. Adorno’s critique of Kant is 
extensive and fragmentary, and a detailed assessment of Adorno’s objections to 
Kant is beyond the bounds of this work. I will focus principally on Adorno’s 
socio-historic deconstruction of the antinomy, and secondly, his discussion of 
Kant’s theory of the will. The second chapter will begin by discussing why 
Adorno thinks that the individual experiences himself as both free and unfree in 
contemporary society, but why he is in fact unfree. I will then argue that this 
should not lead us to conclude that Adorno holds that there is no possibility of 
freedom. I will outline what Adorno thinks that the self-experience of freedom 
does consist of; that is, in the interplay between ego and impulse. The third chapter 
will seek to ascertain how it is the self-experience of freedom might relate to the 
somatic impulse that Adorno thinks that morality requires of us. In particular, I 
will examine the possibility that Adorno arrives at an ethics of resistance, and 
outline certain objections that might arise. In the final chapter, I will distinguish 
between Adorno’s negative freedom, and what he might take ‘autonomy’ to 
consist in. This will then lead me to an analysis of Adorno’s suggestions as to 
what social changes would be necessary in order for freedom to be instantiated, 
and how this might relate to the other arguments that he advances in his discussion 
of freedom. I will not examine Adorno’s conception of freedom and its relation to 
identity-thinking and what Adorno refers to as the non-identical, because this 
would require more attention than would be possible in this work. For the same 
reason, I will not look at Adorno’s aesthetics and its relation to his account of 
freedom. 
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I 
 
ADORNO, KANT, AND FREEDOM 
 
 
 
According to Adorno, Kant’s philosophy ends up ‘dispensing with freedom 
entirely’ and the idea of freedom ‘dwindles to the point of extinction’ in his 
thought19 We might then wonder why Adorno thinks it is worthwhile devoting 
much of the ‘Freedom’ chapter of Negative Dialectics –and his lectures ‘History 
and Freedom’ – to a critique of Kant. If it is true that Kantian philosophy fails so 
miserably at arriving at a plausible or coherent account of freedom, why not focus 
instead on Hegel or Marx? Firstly, Adorno thinks that Kant articulates the 
contradictions inherent in the concept of freedom that subsequent philosophies 
gloss over. Secondly, certain elements of Kant’s account of freedom do have 
potentially progressive elements. In this chapter, I will examine two aspects of 
Adorno’s critique of Kant’s theory of freedom. The first is Adorno’s claim that 
both the idea of freedom and the thing itself are historic. One way in which 
Adorno shows this is via his socio-historical deconstruction of Kant’s third 
antinomy. I will examine this deconstruction in greater detail, with a view to 
showing what implications this has for Adorno’s own account of freedom, and 
why this is a good way of thinking about freedom. I will then examine Adorno’s 
critique of the Kantian conception of the will, and what this implies for his own 
account of freedom. This chapter is not intended as an assessment of the accuracy 
of Adorno’s extensive critique, which would require an independent analysis. 
Rather, the objective is to delineate certain constraints that should be met if 
Adorno is to go beyond only a negative critique of Kant’s notion of the will. 
 
1.The Third Antinomy 
 
In the third antinomy of Critique of Pure Reason , Kant poses the question of 
whether or not it is possible to conceive of there existing a causality that is not 
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only  ‘causality in accordance with laws of nature.’20 The thesis of the antinomy 
postulates the existence of another type of causality – a causality of freedom –  
which must be assumed in order to explain appearances.21 In formulating the 
antinomy, Kant does not set out to prove that freedom understood as the other 
form of causality exists, but rather seeks to demonstrate that freedom and nature 
are not necessarily opposed to one another.22 In the proof of the thesis, Kant argues 
that there must be a sufficient a priori determined cause that occurs ‘without its 
cause being determined according to necessary laws by some other cause 
preceding.’23 If there is only causality in accordance with laws of nature, there 
would be no absolute beginning, and instead an infinite regress of causation. Yet 
the laws of nature require there to be a beginning, and thus, the proof posits the 
existence of an ‘absolute spontaneity of cause’ that begins the series of phenomena 
that then continue according to the laws of nature. This spontaneity is referred to 
by Kant as ‘transcendental freedom.’24 Thus far, the proof claims that freedom is a 
necessary concept to employ in order to understand how it is that the world 
originated. But, there is a further step that Kant takes in his elaboration of 
transcendental freedom. He points to the act of raising himself from his chair. Kant 
suggests that the act that he performs is not simply the result of causes of nature, 
but rather that, by getting up from his earlier position on the chair, he performs a 
free act that is itself the originator of a new series of phenomena that then proceed 
according to the laws of nature. 
 
The antithesis holds that ‘there is no freedom’, and states that ‘everything in the 
world takes place solely in accordance with the laws of nature.’25 The 
transcendental freedom that the thesis postulates as necessary is in fact opposed to 
the laws of cause and effect and therefore natural laws, and the introduction of 
freedom conflicts with the ‘unity of experience’ that is articulated in the law of 
causality. Thus, the antithesis holds the possibility of there existing such a freedom 
to form a contradiction with the established laws of nature. But Kant seeks to 
resolve the supposed antinomy between the thesis and antithesis, and does so with 
reference to transcendental idealism. We can in fact conceive of freedom as being 
possible in the realm of things-in-themselves, whilst still maintaining that the 
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antithesis holds true in the world of appearances. Kant draws a distinction between 
the empirical and intelligible realm, and claims that it is possible to conceive of an 
empirical causality that is the effect of a ‘non-empirical and intelligible 
causality’26. What this would amount to is an event – such as that of Kant rising 
from a chair –  that is not itself conditioned empirically, and that is rather the 
effect of an intelligible cause that is then empirically determined. By resolving the 
antinomy in this way, Kant seeks to demonstrate that freedom is at least not 
theoretically at odds with existent laws of nature, and that, by extension, we can 
hold freedom to be at least a possibility. 
 
2. Freedom as  Historical 
 
A few preliminary remarks should be made about the importance Adorno accords 
Kant’s antinomy. Adorno thinks that the antinomy expresses a contradiction that 
remains central to the notion of freedom; 
 
‘Kant perceived that…on the one hand, freedom is the only possible defining 
feature of humanity, but that, on the other hand, freedom cannot be treated as 
something present, as a fact.’27 
 
For Adorno, freedom is – for the most part – conspicuously absent from modern 
societies. This means that an integral aspect of our humanity is largely unavailable 
to us.  Secondly, Adorno also thinks that the antinomy points to two erroneous 
alternatives – or, as he puts it, two types of slogan – with which we are currently 
presented in modern societies. Thus, there is the ‘hollow pathos’ of political rallies 
to freedom in ‘official declamations’, and at the same time there are empty and 
‘abstract’ deterministic views that do not even accurately identify how individuals 
are determined.28  On the one hand, then, there is the ideological misuse of the idea 
of freedom employed by propagandists, and on the other, generic deterministic 
claims that arise in part from scientific methodologies. Yet while the third 
antinomy points to these contradictions, according to Adorno, Kant himself 
attempts to ‘purify freedom’, which leads to a vague and shadowy conception of 
freedom, in which freedom comes to reside in an intelligible realm removed from 
actual, empirical conditions. 
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How, then, should we begin to think about freedom such that we are neither guilty 
of sloganeering nor abstraction? Firstly, Adorno states that reflecting on the 
question of free will turns it into a question for the ‘philosophy of history’, and 
then asks ‘why have the two theses, ‘The will is free’ and ‘The will is unfree,’ 
become an antinomy?’29 Contra Kant, Adorno holds the contradiction expressed in 
the third antinomy to arise only at a given point in history; more precisely, as the 
result of socio-economic developments in the early modern period. For Adorno, 
both the concept of freedom and the ‘thing itself’ are historical, and he claims that 
‘whole epochs, whole societies lacked not only the concept of freedom but the 
thing.’30 Both the idea of freedom and freedom itself thus depend on the state of 
the world, and in particular, the formation of the modern individual, and are not 
constants in the way Kant envisages.31Adorno contends that Kant himself is aware 
of the ‘historical origin’ of reflections on the idea of freedom, and quotes a 
passage found in the Groundwork in which Kant seems to confront the historicity 
of the concept; ‘Man was seen to be bound to laws by his duty; but it occurred to 
no one that the only legislation to which man is subject is his own…’32 Kant does 
imply in this passage that there were historical times in which man was not aware 
of his freedom, and rather, unquestioningly assumed himself to simply be tethered 
to duty by laws that he himself did not make. Yet Kant still regards freedom itself 
to be something eternal, rather than historic both as a concept and as an ‘empirical 
substance’.33 Thus, on Adorno’s reading, Kant accepts that it is only at a given 
point in history that man begins to conceive of himself as free, but Kant neglects 
to then carry this idea through and understand that both freedom as an idea and the 
thing itself arise only at a given point in history. 
 
According to Adorno, the social conditions that lead to the apparent contradiction 
that reason experiences when confronted by the antinomy occur when the 
bourgeoisie seek to emancipate themselves from feudal power structures and gain 
independence from earlier hierarchies. Adornos’s central idea is that the bourgeois 
class in the early modern period must assert their freedom by emphasising the 
critical rationality possessed by the individual if they are to successfully break 
away from earlier social structures. The thesis of the third antinomy expresses this 
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attempt by the bourgeois class to theoretically ascribe this form of freedom to 
themselves. Yet this comes into contradiction with developments that are 
inextricably linked to the first occurrence. That is, alongside attempts at 
emancipation via the use of critical rationality, there is also ‘progressive 
scientification’34. The prevalence of the sciences – in particular, psychology – is 
accompanied by increasingly deterministic explanations of human behaviour. The 
bourgeois class, intent on ascribing to themselves freedom derived from their 
critical capacities, simultaneously gain their actual newly found power from their 
increased economic independence. They thus seek to promote the productive 
capacities that require scientific progress. But scientific progress is indissolubly 
bound to a deterministic conception of events and humans based on causal 
explanations that seems to deny the possibility of an existent freedom. 
 
The contradiction found in the antinomy, then, derives from the moment at which 
‘The bourgeois class is in league with [progressive scientification]…insofar as it 
promotes production, but it must fear scientific progress as soon as the progress 
interferes with the belief that its freedom…is existent.’ In the socio-political quest 
for freedom, the bourgeoise seek to arrive at a philosophical conception of 
freedom to bolster their bid for emancipation.35 But this then alters the way in 
which the question of freedom is conceived. It ceases to be regarded as something 
located in the empirical world, and is rather considered to be a metaphysical 
property of the human being; ‘This rational justification of man as free proceeds 
from man’s actual liberation, but attempts to ground this actual liberation in his 
own nature, that is to say, in man’s nature as a subject’.36 Freedom comes to be 
regarded as something removed from the actual, socio-empirical world, and is 
conceived of in a ‘highly external, objective sense.’37 Kant himself claims that, 
whilst we cannot know anything about the intelligible realm, it is at the same time 
the extra-temporal location of our freedom. Yet how can freedom, which Adorno 
thinks that we should view as an ‘attribute’ of temporal action, be predicated of 
something ‘radically non-temporal’38 that we also do not know anything about? 
Adorno states; 
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‘In the abstract universal concept of things ‘beyond nature,’ freedom is 
spiritualised into freedom from the realm of causality. With that, however, it 
becomes a self-deception.’39 
 
Adorno thinks that such a conception of freedom is not only an instance of self-
deception, but that it also has certain pernicious consequences. Given that freedom 
comes to be regarded as something on the other side of an ‘ontological abyss’, 
whose mode of influencing any actual empirical conditions becomes increasingly 
difficult to gage, the result is a certain kind of political apathy and disengagement 
on the part of the subject. When freedom is viewed in abstract terms as something 
that exists outside of time and beyond existing empirical conditions, it becomes an 
empty and only formal concept, devoid of practical significance yet 
simultaneously a legitimisation of the kind of freedoms offered by modern states. 
Furthermore, the idea that we possess intelligible freedom corresponds to 
‘empirical individuals’ being held to be morally accountable and therefore also 
punishable.40 Consequently, Adorno claims that the idea that freedom exists in an 
intelligible realm – and that we are all free – is coupled with ‘repressive 
practice’.41 When individuals are regarded as possessing an intelligible freedom 
that is not located in actual empirical conditions, given the unfreedom of society, 
they are accorded a responsibility that they in large part lack. 
 
Why, then, is it important that Adorno thinks that freedom is a historical concept, 
whose existence can be dated to the emergence of the bourgeois individual 
desirous of emancipation from tutelage? Kant problematically admits that while 
historical man was simply not aware of his freedom, he nonetheless was free. In 
contradistinction to this, like Hegel and Marx, Adorno thinks that idea of freedom 
itself only arises at a given point in history with the emergence of the self-
conscious modern individual. Medieval serfs possessed neither the concept of 
themselves as free, nor would anything that we recognise as freedom be a concrete 
reality for them. Adorno’s deconstruction of the antinomy points to the possibility 
that the idea of freedom and its actual realisation are inextricably linked to socio-
economic developments. Furthermore, for Adorno, Kant’s antinomy expresses the 
fact that the notion of an economic subject free to partake in a capitalist system of 
exchange is, from the very outset, a contradiction. The bourgeoisie might regard 
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themselves to be free, as economic agents but also in more general terms, and yet 
the basis of their freedom relies on the deterministic explanations of science that 
cannot be eliminated if the economic system that accords them their freedom is to 
continue. It is the actual social impotence of the bourgeoisie that then results in 
their attributing to themselves an increasingly abstract conception of freedom that 
has no basis in the empirical, temporal world. 
 
Adorno credits Hegel with what he regards to be the crucial insight that, while we 
may think that freedom is a subjective quality possessed by the individual, it is in 
fact  something that is dependent on the ‘objective reality’ that the individual alone 
is incapable of influencing.42 However, Hegel wrongly conceives of freedom as 
something that is realised in the ever more rational social structures of Sittlichkeit, 
and in fact instantiated in the society of his day. He thereby offers a false 
reconciliation to the problem of freedom by suggesting that freedom has in fact 
been realised via social forms of rationality. Thus, on the one hand, viewing 
freedom as a historical idea and substance could have progressive implications. 
Rather than assuming that freedom is something we possess by virtue of our 
rationality, we will begin to look at the socio-historic conditions in which we find 
ourselves, and question whether or not they might allow for something like 
freedom. However, on the other hand, it can lead to a Hegelian type conception of 
freedom as something that has in fact been realised at a certain point in history, 
and thus possibly to an affirmation of the actually unfree status quo. For Adorno, 
the whole is the false, and not the location of a socialised freedom, but rather the 
seat of irrationality and repression. More will be said about this in chapter two. 
 
 
3.The Will 
 
Thus, what has so far been suggested via an examination of the socio-historic 
deconstruction of the third antinomy is that Adorno thinks that freedom arises at a 
particular point in history. However, while Adorno views the idea of freedom as 
historical, this should not lead us to conclude that he regards it to be simply a 
relative concept that is no longer of relevance or of which nothing concrete can be 
said. As was mentioned in the introduction, Adorno would hold such a summation 
to be quite obviously erroneous; the possibility of morality and ideas such as 
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justice and punishment hinge on the question of freedom.43 Furthermore, even if  
freedom is a historical idea that undergoes changes through time, this should not 
lead to the formulation of crude, historicist conceptions of freedom that suggest 
that nothing whatsoever can be said of it. The point, for Adorno, is to 
simultaneously hold on to the ‘permanent component’ of freedom without treating 
the concept itself as if it were unchangeable and ‘universal’.44 One question, then, 
in assessing Adorno’s own account of freedom is whether or not he manages to 
identify the unchangeable elements in the concept of freedom whilst remaining 
sensitive to the historically shifting forms freedom might take. In Adorno’s 
analysis of Kantian willing he highlights what he regards to be the wrong way of 
thinking about what might be viewed as the permanent component of the concept 
of freedom; that is, the Kantian notion of free will. 
 
In Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant equates the will with reason, 
and the possibility of ‘determining oneself to action in accordance with the idea of 
certain laws’.45 For Kant, the will is a kind of causality that only belongs to 
rational beings that can determine themselves in this manner. While other beings 
are subject to natural necessity, rational beings have wills understood as a 
causality that possesses the ‘property’ of freedom, in the negative sense of being 
‘able to work independently of determination by alien causes.’46 Adorno’s critique 
of Kant’s notion of willing underscores his own account of the self-experience of 
freedom that will be discussed in chapter two. He levels a number of different 
objections at Kant’s notion of willing, and yet he does not think that the Kantian 
conception of the will should be dismissed. Rather, Kant‘s account – although 
theoretically wrong – does begin to point to the way in which we ought to think 
about how it is that we make decisions. I will not here examine Adorno’s more 
positive claims concerning freedom, but rather aim to mark out what his own 
account must respond to given his own critique. 
 
First, then, Adorno thinks that even thinking about freedom and willing on only an 
individual level as Kant does is problematic. The idea that we could conceive of 
ourselves as possessors of something like a free will in the first place is  in fact 
continually undermined by existing reality; ‘countless moments of external – 
notably social – reality invade the decisions designated by the words ‘will’ and 
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‘freedom’.’47 Our decisions are invaded by the external and heternonomous in a 
way that Kant’s definition of free will ignores.  Kant’s efforts to show that a truly 
free and rational agent is the ‘author of its own principles independently of alien 
influences’48 ignores the extent to which we are in fact determined by the external 
world. But Adorno’s thesis in this passage is not simply that we are determined by 
empirical cause and effect as traditional philosophy has understood it. He 
emphasises the extent to which social reality invades our decisions. 
 
This has several implications. Firstly, any conception of freedom that we may 
have should be inextricably linked to considerations about the social conditions in 
which we find ourselves; and further, that we should be concerned with the extent 
to which we are determined by the social realm.49 Adorno suggests that we 
become aware of the bounds of our freedom not only because we are ‘part of 
nature’, but also because we are ‘powerless against society.’50 For Adorno, 
unfreedom has its roots in societal coercion rather than natural necessity. In this 
way, he moves the grounds of the discussion away from the question of how we 
can be free given our determination by natural cause and effect, to instead 
emphasise the way in which actual societal processes block the possibility of 
freedom even in individual decisions that we might otherwise regard to be in some 
sense free standing. 
 
Adorno uses the word ‘vermittelt’ to signify what has been rendered ‘invade’ in 
the 1973 translation of Negative Dialectics. But other translations of ‘vermittelt’  
could be to ‘mediate’ or ‘interfere’. This is important, because in the original 
translation, the use of ‘invade’ suggests the idea of society as necessarily existing 
as a kind of hostile force that determines the individual in a coercive way. But 
what Adorno seems to in fact be suggesting is something more subtle. That is, our 
decisions are mediated by society, and as such, cannot be regarded as stemming 
only from our own powers of self-legislation via the use of our reason. This could 
mean that society has the potential to determine us against our interests, as it does 
in modernity, but it is also the less strong claim that decisions that we make cannot 
be detached from their social context. Further, Adorno thinks that the experience 
of the antagonisms of sociality is in fact necessary for the very formation of the 
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concept of freedom. This is the Hegelian idea that freedom only arises from 
sociality and the encounter between the subject and the other; like Hegel, Adorno 
thinks that ‘it is only from that which has been divided from the I, from that which 
is necessarily against it, that the subject acquires the concept of freedom….which 
it will then relate to its own monadological structure.’51 Adorno has in mind 
Hegel’s master and slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in which the 
subject only forms a sense of its self in relation to the other who limits the subject. 
Equally, the individual only forms a sense of its own freedom when it is presented 
with the other which it encounters as an obstacle to his own determination. 
 
However, we should not take this to mean that no sense can be derived from the 
idea of the existence of something like an individual will. In fact, Adorno clearly 
thinks that the Kantian conception of the individual will does, from a 
phenomenological point of view, make sense; there is some truth to the idea of the 
will as the Kantian moment of unity;  ‘When we look at the individual impulses, 
the will is indeed independent, quasi-thinglike…’52 Importantly, however, Adorno 
conceives of the will as something which forms the unification of impulses, rather 
than something that equates with pure reason. Thus, Adorno does concede that 
Kant is at least right to talk about something like an individual will as a unifying 
moment given the way we experience ourselves as acting in the world. However, 
when it comes to thinking about what the actual process of willing requires, 
Adorno is at odds with the Kantian picture. The problem for Adorno is that Kant 
equates the will with reason and consciousness; he regards the will to be solely 
directed by reasons, where the will becomes ‘nothing other than …a kind of 
activity…that has wholly purified itself of all dependency on pre-existing 
objects.’53 Why is it significant that Kant equates freedom only with rational 
insight and theoretical consciousness? Adorno claims that, because Kant equates 
reason with the ability to follow rules or laws, freedom itself becomes ‘necessarily 
reduced to obedience to laws’.54 Thus, the individual comes to be regarded as 
being free only when following his reason, which is conceived of as rule-
following. Adorno claims that this ‘turns freedom into something that might be 
termed unfree because of the need to obey laws.’55 
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I will not here examine whether or not Adorno is right to equate unfreedom and 
obedience to laws, but it is important to note that such an argument requires a 
great deal more substantiation than is here offered by Adorno. In fact, Adorno 
himself does not think that what he refers to as the ‘abstract protestation that the 
law is the negation of freedom’ suffices as an objection to Kant. He also thinks 
that a state of complete lawlessness would equate with unfreedom; it would lead to 
a Hobbesian state in which everyone ‘would be exposed to oppression at the hands 
of everyone else.’56 In fact while Adorno clearly thinks that freedom cannot 
simply be understood as an obedience to laws flowing from one’s use of reason, 
and that such an equation would lead to a state of unfreedom, it also has certain 
progressive implications for the subject. By equating the will with reason, Kant 
thereby renders the will as something separate from external material. This allows 
the subject of Kantian philosophy to become an autonomous moral subject; one 
that is not judged by heternonomous standards and is instead able to self-legislate, 
and is thus in some sense removed from the arbitrary and coercive norms of 
hierarchical societies: 
 
‘Kant’s relegation of ethics to the sober unity of reason was an act of bourgeois 
majesty despite the false consciousness in his objectification of the will.’57 
 
By being conceived of as able to self-legislate according to reason, the individual 
is no longer ‘weighed by standards that are inwardly and outwardly…alien to the 
subject.’58  Thus, Kant’s equation of freedom and theoretical consciousness has the 
potential to be both repressive and progressive. On the one hand, freedom comes 
to be seen to be equivalent only to rule following, and on the other, it enables the 
subject to be viewed as able to self-legislate by their use of reason. 
 
But why, then, is it problematic that freedom comes to be seen as a form of law 
following? Adorno thinks that the law also ‘encompasses…the instinctual energies 
of human beings.’59 While Adorno concedes this to be in some sense necessary, 
rather than only containing these energies, the law ends up by ‘sublimating [the 
energies] out of existence.’60Even if it is true that Kant’s conception of freedom 
might have progressive implications for the way in which the subject comes to be 
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viewed, it rests on what Adorno holds to be a false premise; that is, that the will is 
equivalent only to reason, and independent from any kind of external 
determination. This latter point is where we come to what Adorno regards to be 
the fundamental problem with the way in which Kant conceives of the will. That 
is, he suggests that the will as pure practical reason is something that is entirely 
independent of any external determinants. But what if certain external 
determinants are in some way necessary for the act of willing, and therefore for 
freedom itself? 
 
For Adorno, Kant’s conception of the will does not encompass what is actually 
required of the individual such that he can be moved to action. It is not that we 
should simply disregard the role of consciousness in the act of willing, because 
Adorno does hold it to be a necessary aspect of the will.61 Adorno thinks that an 
account of willing that detaches the will from reason leads to blind irrationalism 
and ‘stands ready for every misdeed.’62 But importantly, Adorno thinks that the 
process of willing requires something more than just theoretical consciousness or 
rational thinking. Rather, willing also requires ‘something physical which 
consciousness does not exhaust.’63 The idea is that we might experience the will as 
the ‘centralising unit’ of the self, without which no freedom would be possible 
given that we would cease to be a unit of self-consciousness, but in order that we 
will anything at all, what is needed is an irrational, physical element left out by the 
Kantian account. The notion that decision making – and therefore, freedom – 
requires a physical element could be viewed as an obscure thesis that requires 
considerable substantiation. This will be the subject of chapter two. 
 
Thus, Adorno thinks that, by omitting the role of a non-rational element in our 
decision-making, Kant arrives at a formulation of willing that seeks to ‘cleanse’ 
the will from its external determinants that are in fact necessary for the will’s very 
formation, and thereby, Kant’s conception of the will is ‘falsified’ by the ‘absolute 
separation of the will from its material…’64.  We then come to view nature as 
something that is separate from reason, and as something that is opposed to, and 
must be controlled by, the will. Kant’s equation of will and reason thus has far 
reaching consequences. Not only is it impossible that a will removed from external 
determinants could exist, but also, when we seek to ‘cleanse’ the will from these 
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determinants in the way in which Kant does, we come to take on the wrong 
attitude towards both ourselves and external nature. For Kant, the will can only be 
free if it is not determined by the realm of nature. Yet, this results in an abstraction 
and ignores the extent to which the subject is an ‘empirical, natural, individual 
creature’65, and thus neglects the degree of our dependence on nature. As will be 
discussed in chapter two, Adorno does not think that this is solely a theoretical 
error, but rather something that has implications for our relation both to externality 
and to ourselves. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is my contention that Adorno does in fact provide an account of freedom that 
forms, if not a comprehensive theory, a re-orientation of freedom away from the 
Kantian model. Having considered two aspects of Adorno’s critique of Kant, it is 
possible to begin to formulate a requirements for Adorno’s own treatment of 
freedom if he is to go beyond only a negative critique. To begin with, unlike Kant, 
Adorno views the idea of freedom and the thing itself to only arise at a given point 
in history. Thus, if Adorno’s own treatment of freedom is to succeed, he must be 
at once sensitive to the changes the concept undergoes in history, and yet 
simultaneously identify what might be regarded as the permanent component both 
of the concept and the thing itself. The extent to which he does provide a 
convincing historical orientation of freedom will be discussed in the third and 
fourth chapter. A further question that arises is that, even if we accept that 
Adorno’s socio-historic deconstruction of the third antinomy could be viewed as 
pointing to the way in which the idea of freedom arises at a certain stage in 
economic development, we might object that the third antinomy remains a 
contradiction beyond this particular historical juncture. Thus, the question is 
whether Adorno conceives of his socio-historic deconstruction as an exhaustive 
explanation of the third antinomy, or whether there is another explanation that 
points to its continuing philosophical significance. In the next chapter, I will 
suggest that Adorno does in fact conceive of the third antinomy as also possessing 
phenomenological truth-content from the point of view of the subject’s actual 
experience in contemporary society. 
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Secondly, Adorno must show that his own account of willing – and therefore, the 
self-experience of freedom – requires something other than the possession of a 
theoretical consciousness. Adono must offer what he refers to as a ‘dialectical 
definition’ of  the will.66 According to Adorno, a proper definition of the will 
cannot omit the role of reason in the decision-making process; without 
consciousness there would be no will. Yet simultaneously, we cannot detach from 
the will sensuous determinants in the way that Kant seeks to do. For Kant, the 
sensuous, external determinants are deemed to be heteronomous and result in the 
subject’s unfreedom. For Adorno, a subject’s freedom must involve precisely the 
elements that Kant views as heteronomous, because they form aspects of our 
natural, embodied selves. Freedom would require not the suppression of the 
empirical, natural elements of our existence, but rather the correct attitude towards 
them. Initially appealing, these sorts of claims must be approached with some 
scepticism. How can we arrive at an account of willing that does not neglect these 
elements, but still resembles something that is not only involuntary? In other 
words, how can Adorno show that an inclusion of the determinants that Kant’s 
account seeks to repress could be the source of freedom, and not its opposite? 
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II 
THE SELF-EXPERIENCE OF FREEDOM AND UNFREEDOM 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first section of the chapter, I will show that Adorno does not hold the socio-
historic deconstruction of the third antinomy discussed in the previous chapter to 
be an exhaustive explanation of the contradiction. I will then discuss why Adorno 
thinks that we simultaneously experience ourselves as both free and unfree in 
modern societies. This will then lead me to a possible impasse in Adorno’s 
thought. That is, if we are both internally and externally unfree, and deeply 
entrenched in a deceptive system from which we cannot escape, we might question 
whether or not such an account of the modern social world allows for any 
possibility of freedom. I will argue that Adorno’s account of willing shows that the 
self-experience of freedom remains open to us, but that it requires a radical 
alteration in the way that we conceive both of ourselves, and our relation to 
externality. I go on to examine several objections to Adorno’s account, and offer 
some possible rejoinders. 
 
 
 
I : The Self-experience of Unfreedom 
 
In the first chapter, I discussed the way in which Adorno holds Kant’s third 
antinomy to express the contradictions of a particular time in the early modern 
period in which individuals sought to escape tutelage and thus regard themselves 
as free, and yet whose productive capacities – and thus their actual means of 
emancipation – were based on increasingly deterministic views of the world. One 
problem is whether or not we would agree that Adorno’s deconstruction is an 
exhaustive explanation of the third antinomy, and if it was found to be exhaustive, 
whether this would result in an occlusion of the philosophical content of Kant’s 
formulation. In fact, Adorno also holds the antinomy to be accurate from a 
phenomenological point of view. That is, Adorno claims that the contradiction 
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expressed by the antinomy is also the result of the ‘objective contradictions 
between the experience which consciousness has of itself and its relation to 
totality.’67 This claim suggests an alternative conception of the experiential truth of 
the antinomy, which focuses rather on the conflict between the legality present in 
society on the one hand, and the individual’s sense of his own freedom ‘against 
society and other individuals’ on the other.68 While the first understanding of the 
antinomy occurs at a particular point in history with the increasing prominence of 
the bourgeois class, this second interpretation rather focuses on the actual 
phenomenological experience of the subject in society that is not specific to the 
early modern age. 
 
Thus, according to Adorno, the third antinomy is expressive of objective 
conditions that hold sway in society that result in the subject’s experience of 
themselves as simultaneously free and determined. This is because we possess a 
sense of our own freedom insofar as we can pursue ends that ‘are not directly and 
totally exhausted by social ends.’69 In other words, we think of ourselves as being 
able to opt to do things as individuals able to pursue private interests.70 However, 
this experience is in large part delusive. In fact, in ‘bourgeois society’ – by which 
Adorno seems to have in mind a society based on a capitalist system of exchange 
– both freedom and individuality become mere component features of ideology, 
rather than ideas that have any substantial truth or which correspond to actual 
social reality. Thus, the notion of free individuals choosing to pursue their own 
ends is patently false. I will not here examine the reasons why Adorno holds 
modern societies to be structured in such a way as to deprive the individual of 
freedom, as the subject is vast and has been treated in great detail.71 
 
Actual society prevents freedom and yet the existence of what Adorno refers to as 
‘organised’ society is justified with recourse to an abstract Kantian-type freedom 
that has no basis in existing empirical reality.  Importantly, this formal and 
abstract idea of freedom ‘coincides’ with individuation.72 In other words, freedom 
only becomes an attribute of the subject once individuals exist ‘in the modern 
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sense’.73 By the ‘modern sense’ of the individual, Adorno has in mind the subject 
as both a biological entity and a being constituted by self-reflection.74 Adorno is 
again emphasising the historicity of the concept of freedom. It makes no sense to 
attribute freedom to humans before they become self-reflective and aware of 
themselves as individual entities. But Adorno then makes a further claim that is 
suggestive of a broadly Marxian conception of the origins of our idea of freedom. 
That is, he argues that the concept of individuality itself only comes to the fore 
under a capitalist system of exchange in which the idea of individual independence 
becomes a function of the way in which economic transactions play out: 
 
‘The individual was free as an economically active bourgeois subject, free to the 
extent to which the economic system required him to be autonomous in order to 
function. His autonomy is thus potentially negated at the source.’75 
 
If Adorno is right, freedom comes to be attributed to subjects in order that they can 
engage in capitalist economic practice in the appropriate way. But this passage 
further suggests that this is in some sense necessary in order to further perpetuate 
capitalist systems. Thus, the attribution of freedom to human subjects is not only a 
kind of harmless additional quality that we come to regard ourselves as possessing 
in a particular system of economic exchange. Rather, it is an attribution that is 
necessary for the system to maintain itself. In this sense, the attribution of freedom 
to the subject is not only false, but also morally pernicious as it contributes to the 
continuation of a system in which individuals are in fact forced – and therefore not 
free – to participate in a mode of exchange in order to secure their own self-
preservation. 
 
The Kantian question of whether or not individuals have free will thus misses the 
point entirely, as it treats the individual as if they were an ‘original phenomena’ 
who could be ascribed or denied freedom removed from the socio-economic 
dynamics of their situation. 76 But the alternative response to this should not be 
simply an endorsement of determinism, social or otherwise. There are two reasons 
why this is not the correct stance to uphold. Firstly, the consequences of viewing 
everything as determined culminates simply in an endorsement of the status quo.77 
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Secondly, such a view is guilty of treating the individual as if he simply is only the 
function of the economic system. But human nature cannot simply be reduced to 
its ‘merchandise character’ in this manner. Adorno does not in this passage enlarge 
on what he regards human nature to be comprised of, but the problem with 
determinism is that it views subjects only as component parts of an economic 
system. Whereas there is a sense in which Adorno holds this view of human nature 
to be true under the conditions of late capitalism, determinism wrongly suggests 
that this is necessarily the case.78Contrary to this, Adorno suggests that men have 
‘yet to become themselves’.79This more hopeful suggestion corresponds to 
Adorno’s idea that even in age of universal repression, a ‘picture of freedom’ 
remains in the ‘crushed, abused individual’s features…’80 There is some sense in 
which the individual can still in some way position themselves against society, and 
as such manifest some resistance to it, an idea that will be the subject of 
examination later on. Yet caution should be exercised in attributing to Adorno the 
view that it is in the individual alone that some remnant of freedom remains. In 
fact, there are situations in which it is society that must stand for freedom in 
opposition to individual interest.81 Thus, Adorno does not hold the crude view that 
freedom manifests itself as the lonely individual pitched against the unfreedom of 
a coercive society. The relation that holds between the universal and particular is 
more complex than this; the individual, as an agent and ‘prototype’ of an unfree 
society, is implicated within universal unfreedom; the principle of ‘unreflected 
self-preservation’ is ‘hypostatized in the individual’.82 
 
The idea that the individual is an agent or prototype of society goes some way in 
explaining why Adorno thinks that we experience ourselves as both free and 
unfree. It seems that there are different ways in which the individual can 
experience their unfreedom. The first kind of way relates to external processes. 
Thus, we feel ourselves to be unfree in modern capitalist societies when faced with 
the impossibility of determining our economic and political lives. We cannot 
choose how it is that we involve ourselves in the processes by which society 
constitutes itself, and we experience ourselves only as appendages of society’s 
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objective tendencies.83 As a result of this, we come against the dominant social 
norm and feel ourselves to be helpless and unfree. Secondly, we experience 
unfreedom internally, because the processes of society come to be in some way 
objectified in our own inner lives. Thus, the tendencies of an unfree society play 
out in the psychology of the individual. Yet we exist in a ‘web of delusion’, and in 
fact experience our unfreedom as if it were freedom. We take the fact that our ego 
‘operates coercively on the external world’ as proof of the existence of our own 
freedom.84 However, this experience is not the manifestation of freedom but its 
opposite: it is the ego imitating the coercion that it is itself subjected to by external 
determinants.85 Secondly, we tend to regard ourselves as possessing inner lives 
that are free from external determinants. Again, this is little more than a delusion; 
we find in our inner lives ‘elements of external life that take flight into the 
imagination only because…they have no prospect of being put into practice in the 
real world.’86 However, Adorno does also think that we experience ourselves as 
unfree internally as well as externally. We often fall prey to compulsive internal 
processes such as neuroses that are experienced as if they are alien and 
heteronomous. Such inner states possess truth content, because they demonstrate 
the fallacy to which we fall prey when conceiving of our inner lives as free and 
removed from external determination; ‘they teach people that they are not simply 
what they are in their own intrinsic nature’.87 
 
 
2. Self-Experience of Freedom: The Addendum 
 
Thus far, Adorno’s diagnosis is bleak. We are free neither internally nor 
externally. Accorded an abstract and formal freedom, we are repressed by society, 
and also by our own internal processes. Any thoughts to the contrary are instances 
of delusion. At this point, there are many objections that could be made to what 
appears to be an extreme – and possibly reductive – depiction of the human lot in 
modern society. It might be objected that in some situations, there may be a very 
real sense in which we do not simply feel free, but are free. We could, for instance, 
point to historical developments that suggest our freedom from oppressive systems 
that existed at earlier points in history. Secondly, we may wish to begin to 
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question what Adorno himself wishes to achieve by presenting us with such a 
desolate picture of the possibilities of mankind. In much of his work, he suggests 
that we should aim for human freedom, yet, given the delusive nature of any 
experience of freedom that we have, the idea that it is something that we ought to 
strive for seems to be oddly optimistic. This second worry will be examined later. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine whether or not Adorno could meet 
the first objection by examining the role the addendum – or additional factor – 
plays in his conception of freedom. 
 
The objection could run as follows. Adorno suggests that, when we experience 
ourselves as free, we are simply deluding ourselves and mistaking instances of 
what is in fact internalised societal coercion as the ability to be self-determining. 
The implication of this is that there is no hope for any kind of freedom in our 
decision-making, and we must accept that we are at the behest of heteronomous 
powers over which we have no control. It seems, then, that we reach a dead end: 
both our internal and external existences are subjected to a system ‘from which 
everything follows.’88 If this is the case, it is unclear that Adorno’s critique of 
Kantian freedom leaves open the possibility of anything resembling an alternative 
conception of free agency. 
 
 However, Adorno does not in fact hold such a diagnosis to be right. Freedom 
remains a possibility. Yet there must be a considerable shift in the way in which 
we understand how we experience something like freedom in the first place. 
Adorno suggests that the idea of freedom can at least in part be understood with 
reference to Kant’s notion of spontaneity. While Kant intends the concept to refer 
to ‘consciousness’s faculty for the activity of thought’89, Adorno claims that, in 
fact, the concept – even as Kant uses it – is comprised of a duality between the ego 
or ‘active, thinking behaviour’ and ‘involuntary’ activity.90 This implies that 
spontaneity is necessary for the unity of consciousness, or the ego; ‘it is the true 
determining factor of the fixed ego, identical with itself.’91 Yet, contra Kant, 
Adorno suggests that, spontaneity – understood as an activity – contains an 
involuntary, pre-theoretical moment. He argues that this is further borne out by 
examining the everyday usage of spontaneity: 
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‘A person is spontaneous if he performs an action in a particular situation; but we 
only call his action spontaneous if it does not follow logically from prior 
considerations but instead has something abrupt or sudden about it…’ 
 
Spontaneity thus points to the existence of a duality between ego and some other 
element,  that contains within it a physical or somatic element. The way in which 
this duality relates to freedom is best understood by what Adorno names the 
‘Addendum’ [‘Additional factor’] or ‘Das Hinzutretende’, a term that has no 
philosophical precedence. In a lecture, Adorno states that; 
 
‘The concept of freedom could not be formulated in the absence of a recourse to 
something prior to the ego, to an impulse that is in some sense a bodily impulse 
that has not yet been subjected to the centralising authority of consciousness.’ 
 
What this statement suggests is that our idea of freedom derives from something 
that precedes the formation of the ego or unified self. It points to the possibility 
that the notion of freedom itself has its origins in the experience of an impulse that 
is at least in part somatic. Yet there is an ambiguity in Adorno’s statement: he does 
not say that that this impulse, without which freedom would be unimaginable, is 
purely corporeal, but rather that its origins are in some measure physical rather 
than only mental. Yet what has this to do with freedom? To begin with, Adorno 
explicates the addendum phenomenologically. Thus, he points to the way in which 
we make decisions. Contra Kant, he suggests that decisions do not take place in a 
smooth and uninterrupted chain of cause and effect. In fact, Adorno argues that 
willing requires that we ‘experience a sort of jolt’ that is itself a kind of physical 
impulse when we make decisions.92 On this view, a free act requires more than 
only consciousness, but a somatic element. Adorno claims that Hamlet is an 
example of the ‘chasm…between consciousness and action’; Hamlet both knows 
himself to be under an obligation, but can only carry out his intention with the 
experience of a ‘violent, sudden impulse’.93 He is able to avenge his father’s death 
only when he experiences the additional factor; the ‘element in his taking action 
that goes beyond rationality.’94 Without this experience, Hamlet would never be 
able to escape the confines of theoretical consciousness. 
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Adorno further claims that impulses are closely connected to mimetic behaviour, 
which he describes as behaviour that is not ‘causally determined by objective 
factors, but involves instead an involuntary adjustment to something 
extramental.’95 Adorno’s comparison between the addendum and mimetic 
behaviour raises various questions. If certain impulses are not causally determined 
by objective factors, they thereby seem to possess an element of independence. 
But this is also problematic. What is it about mimetic behaviour and impulses that 
allows them to exist in a realm somehow removed from objective factors? 
Secondly, this claim also suggests a certain moment of compulsion in the 
decision-making process: the adjustment is involuntary. How can something that 
is involuntary simultaneously be free? Finally, the comparison between the 
addendum and mimetic behaviour will prove to be of importance in establishing a 
possible link between Adorno’s notion of freedom as impulse and his moral 
philosophy, which in part advocates a mimetic response to suffering. 
 
Adorno further argues that impulses themselves are in fact ‘proofs’ of freedom, 
and that they point to a time at which the inner and outer, or internal and external, 
did not suffer strict demarcation.96The self-experience of freedom requires a 
somatic element, but it cannot be reduced to only pure physicality; freedom also 
needs a theoretical consciousness; ‘our entire experience of freedom is tied up 
with consciousness.’97 Our experience of freedom is linked to memory and a 
process of anamnesis of an earlier stage of development in which we had yet to 
become a fully integrated consciousness. To even derive an idea of freedom we 
must recall an ‘archaic’ impulse that is somehow untamed.98 What Adorno means 
by ‘archaic’ is not immediately apparent. One possible interpretation is that an 
archaic impulse could be regarded as something that is broadly irrational. 
However, Adorno suggests that the addendum is not simply irrational, although it 
might be considered to be so from the point of view of rationalist theories of the 
will. More precisely, the addendum is – as the name itself suggests – an element 
that is added to rationality.99 It comes to exist when consciousness participates in 
decisions that ‘were originally blind and reflexive in nature.’ 
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Adorno’s conception of the will is thus of something that has both a rational and 
irrational moment; it possesses both ‘modern, bourgeois, unified qualities’, as well 
as ‘archaic features.’100 Yet the archaic features of the will come to appear to the 
subject as increasingly chaotic when the ego gains control over itself and nature, 
and the subject thus comes to find the basis of his own freedom questionable 
because of its uncontrolled aspect.101 In fact, the mistrust with which we begin to 
perceive these uncontrolled responses to stimuli leads to forms of regression102. 
What Adorno has in mind here seems to be roughly borrowed from Freud; that is, 
the idea that, in subjecting our impulses to increased control via the ego, the 
impulses are no longer able to occur in their natural context. Rather, they are 
repressed, which then leads to various forms of regressive behaviour, instances of 
which, for Adorno, include such phenomena as identification with fascist 
ideologies and passive and uncritical enjoyment of various cultural products.  
 
By contrast, the additional factor allows us to escape the ‘spiritual prison of mere 
consciousness’ and instead enables us to enter into a ‘realm of objects that is 
normally barred to us by our own rationality.’103 We cease to be something that is 
divided and are instead ‘overcome as in a flash’. The impulse thus contains a 
remnant of the ‘union of reason and nature’ because it allows us to momentarily 
break away from a self that is driven by a  predominantly theoretical and rational 
consciousness104 This suggests that we must review how we conceive of the 
relation that holds between freedom and nature. In Kant the natural is that which is 
subjected to deterministic causal laws, compared to the freedom that we enjoy by 
giving ourselves laws. But this implies that nature is simply something to be 
overcome by the subject in its bid for self-determination. Yet, as was mentioned 
earlier, Adorno holds the addendum to in some sense point beyond this diremption 
that has taken place between reason and nature. Impulses could provide a way of 
experiencing reason and nature as in a certain sense unified, and the latter ceases 
to be regarded only as that which is dominated by the former; 
 
‘With that impulse freedom extends to the realm of experience; this animates the 
concept of freedom as a state that would be no more blind nature than it would be 
oppressed nature. Its phantasm – which reason will not allow to be withered by 
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any proof of causal interdependence – is the phantasm of reconciling nature and 
the mind.’105 
 
The idea is that, rather than attempting to suppress or subordinate our impulses, 
we must understand them as constitutive of our agency. This in part explains how 
Adorno can regard something which is involuntary as simultaneously being free. 
In experiencing certain impulses, we thereby accept that we are to an extent 
determined by nature. Yet, this does not necessarily, at least according to Adorno, 
mean that we should consider ourselves to be fully determined by nature. As 
Bowie points out, subjectivity comes to be viewed as simultaneously based in 
nature and what comes to transcend it.106 The notion of impulse thus points to a 
freedom that could be empirically experienced, rather than contained within an 
intelligible world removed from the physical realm. Adorno suggests that the 
examples that Kant employs to demonstrate the existence of transcendental 
freedom themselves point to the occurrence of a jolt in our decision-making 
process, yet he neglects to convincingly show this to be the case. But Adorno’s 
suggestion is that traditional philosophy wrongly holds that ‘the subject’s 
reflection alone is able, if not to break through natural causality, at least to change 
its direction by adding other motivational chains.’107 Yet the notion of a jolt 
contradicts this view; for Adorno, the existence of an additional factor in the 
process of willing shows that reflection alone is not sufficient for the self-
experience of freedom. 
 
Importantly, Adorno’s contention that freedom requires an interplay between the 
ego and impulses that are otherwise repressed involves and depends upon a 
particular conception of the way in which the individual self is structured. In large 
part Adorno accepts the Freudian analysis of the relation that holds between the 
ego and the id. Freud regards the ego as the ‘agency of adaptation’ that seems to 
be unified relative to what is described by Pontalis and Laplance as the ‘anarchic, 
fragmentary functioning’ of our instinctual energies.108 For Freud, the ego emerges 
from the id as the result of external pressures, and it comes to allow the individual 
to gain control by the mastery and repression of these instincts. It is clear that 
Adorno follows Freud firstly in his understanding of the ego as something that 
itself derives from bodily sensations and that is formed only after contact with the 
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‘interhuman’ world. Secondly, like Freud, Adorno also holds that the ego comes to 
repress the id or impulses. Adorno thus by and large accepts Freud’s conception of 
the self as formed by the libidinous energies of the id that come to be repressed by 
the centralising authority of the ego, that is itself formed from these energies.  
 
If Adorno for the most part accepts the Freudian theory of the self, what 
implications does this have for his conception of freedom? Firstly, it is interesting 
to note that Freud himself does not appear to have much faith in the idea that we 
are free. In fact, in his essay ‘The Uncanny’, Freud goes so far as to dismiss 
freedom as a kind of fantasy that we have that arises from thwarted wish-
fulfilment: 
 
‘There are also…all those strivings of the ego which adverse external 
circumstances have crushed, and all our suppressed acts of volition which nourish 
us in the illusion of Free Will.’109 
 
Given that Adorno thinks that we do have a potentiality for freedom in the 
impulses, how can this be reconciled with his acceptance of Freud’s analysis of the 
self? In other words, what distinctions can be made between Freud and Adorno’s 
theory of the self such that Adorno can claim that something like freedom remains 
possible? Firstly, whilst Freud holds that the repression of our libidinal energies is 
necessary for there to be any form of social cohesion, Adorno regards this to be 
the case in a situation whereby societal repression already holds. In other words, in 
a differently structured social world, our libidinous energies or impulses could be 
expressed in such  a way that they would not only be aggressive.  This will be 
discussed in more detail in the fourth chapter. Thus, for Adorno, the problem with 
classical psychoanalysis is the following: 
 
‘On the one hand, it criticised the authority of moral autonomy…the super-
ego…as, in origin, a mental equivalent of unfreedom…but at the same time, 
psychoanalysis was terribly afraid of what might happen if people no longer had a 
super-ego.’ 
 
This passage suggests that Adorno regards Freud as not following through with his 
analysis by his lack of recognition of the potentially emancipatory nature of our 
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libidinous energies. While Adorno agrees that repression and the mastery of the 
instincts is necessary for self-preservation and the existence of society, this need 
not be the case at all points of human history. Rather, the idea that the expression 
of libidinous energies is something to be feared is something that is socially and 
historically contingent rather than a timeless fact of human existence. The reason, 
then, that Adorno can continue to claim that something like freedom might be 
available to us whilst still working within the framework of a Freudian conception 
of the self is because he leaves open the possibility that our drives could in 
different social circumstances manifest themselves as forms of liberation from the 
repressive and cohesive ego. One possible response to Adorno’s use of Freud is to 
question his treatment of the ego. While he clearly views the ego as being a 
necessary component of the self-experience of freedom, in his final analysis it 
remains the organon of repression. But as will be discussed later in the chapter, 
there are alternate ways of conceiving of ego processes such that these processes 
could be viewed as in themselves liberating. This would in turn leave open the 
possibility that the potentialities of free agency are greater than Adorno himself 
suggests. 
 
 
3.Objections to the addendum 
 
There are many questions and concerns that arise from Adorno’s notion of the 
additional factor. It is appealing precisely because it provides a possible way of 
understanding free agency that does not neglect corporeality. Yet there is a danger 
that the addendum remains a whimsical notion that does not in fact achieve what it 
sets out to do; that is, to show a way in which mind and nature could be reconciled 
in an account of free agency. Firstly, Adorno relies heavily on the notion of 
impulses. We may wish to exercise a certain amount of caution in unquestioningly 
accepting this to be a convincing alternative to more traditional theories of agency. 
No distinction is made between the plethora of different types of impulse that we 
might have, some of which would seem to be entirely opposed to freedom. If 
Adorno is to be convincing, it seems that a more refined account of impulse ought 
to be arrived at. There is also a sense in which more work must be done if it is to 
be successfully shown that impulses are not to be regarded only as reflexes or 
instances of blind nature. 
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Even less clear is how the addendum can be translated into a convincing account 
of social freedom. Freyenhagen suggests that Adorno’s emphasis on physical 
impulse in his account of freedom has a normative, ethical import, and that the 
addendum has direct implications for social theory.110 Yet even if this is shown to 
be true, it is not clear how impulses can be viewed as leading directly to a rational 
social order. This need not trouble Adorno in that he does not think that we are 
able to say much from our current vantage point about what a rational society 
might look like. Yet this latter view does not exempt him from the task of showing 
how his own re-orientation of the way in which we conceive of freedom might 
begin to relate to our concern with the question of how we ought to live in the 
modern social world. 
 
The intention of the rest of this chapter will be to show that Adorno’s account of 
impulse should be regarded as constituting a plausible re-orientation of the concept 
of freedom away from the Kantian model. In order to do this, a variety of 
objections – mostly centring on the role played by impulse in Adorno’s account – 
will be considered. I will first examine the possibility that the contention that 
impulses are constitutive of freedom is in fact inconsistent with other aspects of 
Adorno’s philosophy. While Adorno often intentionally contradicts himself in 
order to take up a dialectical standpoint in the treatment of a given concept, it 
might be argued that the inconsistencies present in his analysis of freedom 
substantially weaken his account. I will suggest several responses to these 
objections, and will argue that Adorno is not in fact guilty of inconsistency. 
Secondly, I will examine more general worries that we might have with the 
addendum, and again offer some possible responses. However, while it is 
important to arrive at a clearer conception of what the addendum might mean for 
our conception of freedom, it must not be hypostasised. Adorno does not intend to 
arrive at a comprehensive theory of freedom, but rather provide a new model by 
which we can begin to think about human freedom. What needs, then, to be 
established is why the addendum is a good way of thinking about freedom, 
 
To begin with, then, we might worry that, in arriving at the idea of an additional 
factor that occurs when we act freely, Adorno in fact falls in to territory that 
cannot be squared with the rest of his philosophy. In one of the lectures in which 
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he discusses the addendum, he suggests that, in allowing ourselves to experience 
certain forms of impulsiveness we ‘feel that we are ourselves.’111 As was 
discussed earlier, he also suggests that there is a moment in which we somehow 
enter in to a realm of objects that is otherwise not open to us. However, as 
O’Connor points out, Adorno most often finds claims to immediacy to be suspect 
in a world that he regards to be thoroughly mediated.112.What is puzzling, then, is 
that Adorno would claim of impulse that it allows us to directly experience the 
world of objects that he usually regards to be barred to us, when he would be the 
first to dismiss such claims as instances of false consciousness. It seems that, in 
the lecture in which these claims are found, he is himself aware of the possible 
problems implicit in his account when he talks about the difficulty of discussing 
such matters without reifying them.113 Yet this does not answer the objection but 
rather suggests that it is difficult to talk of this kind of experience. Thus, it could 
be objected that, we might feel that we are ourselves in these sorts of experience 
when our freedom supposedly manifests itself, but who is to say that this is not 
simply another instance of the falsity of self-experience in the ‘web of delusion’ 
that Adorno thinks that we inhabit in modern capitalist societies? 
 
Two answers can be made on Adorno’s behalf. Firstly, in response to the latter 
question, what could be said to differentiate the impulses of which Adorno speaks 
from delusive experiences of freedom is precisely their physical element. Thus, it 
seems that Adorno holds it to be the case that somatic impulses allow us to 
experience ourselves and externality in such a way that affords us a momentary 
respite from a world that is otherwise thoroughly mediated as a result of the kind 
of jolt that occurs, which presumably cannot be mistaken for anything else. 
Secondly, in an aphorism found in Minima Moralia on the subject of love, Adorno 
suggests that immediacy is possible even in a system in which everything is 
determined and mediated. The idea is that there is a tendency to think of feelings 
like love as involuntary or immediate, but, given the present economic 
determination of society, the very possibility that such a feelings can take place 
removed from other determinants is doubtful. Yet, importantly for the discussion 
of impulse, Adorno does suggest that the existence of immediacy in fact remains a 
possibility; he equates the act of loving as ‘not letting immediacy wither under the 
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omnipresent weight of mediation and economics…’114 Thus, while it is true that 
Adorno holds claims to immediacy to in general be suspect, he does not hold that 
such claims cannot be made at all. Rather, immediacy cannot simply be assumed, 
and it is something that is always on the cusp of being reified and mediated. 
 
But if it is true that impulses can be immediate, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
distinguish impulses from the reflexes that take place in the individual on an 
unconscious level. The problem is that, throughout his work, Adorno repeatedly 
speaks of reflexes as a symptom of damaged agency within modern societies; he 
talks of human beings ‘regressing to the reactions of amphibians.’115 Paradigm 
instances of reflexes in a fully integrated society is the experience of boredom 
when faced with ‘objective dullness’116, or the passivity with which we absorb 
cultural products. But how is the impulse different from such reflexes? In what 
sense does it avoid the unfreedom that characterises these kinds of situational 
responses? Adorno seems to anticipate this worry: 
 
‘It is quite possible that this impulse was originally a kind of reflex, too. In that 
case, it was only through the participation of consciousness in actions that were 
originally blind and reflexive in nature that this additional factor…[that is] a 
constitutive element of the will came into being.’117 
 
This is a clear explanation of why impulses cannot simply be equated with 
reflexes. Whilst impulses might have originated as a form of reflex, unlike the 
latter, they come to interact with consciousness. As was discussed earlier, freedom 
requires both a somatic element and theoretical consciousness. Thus, Adorno can 
maintain the distinction between reflexes and impulses; whilst still admitting the 
possibility that impulses have their origins in reflexes, he can claim that, unlike 
reflexes, impulses are in some sense constitutive of freedom. 
 
Yet while Adorno may not be guilty of inconsistency, there are several objections 
that must be addressed if it is to be successfully demonstrated that the concept of 
freedom could plausibly be re-oriented in this manner. As was pointed out earlier, 
Adorno is at odds with the rest of philosophical tradition with such a thesis, which 
is something that he is well aware of; he points to the ‘astonishing fact’ that 
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philosophers throughout history have largely regarded instincts as things that are 
in need of being ‘controlled and suppressed.’118 But what reason is there to follow 
Adorno in his contrarian assessment? In fact, there are several objections that 
might prevent us from accepting his claim. Firstly, the notion of impulse itself 
carries with it various problems that could be said to prevent us from substantially 
revising our conception of freedom. Secondly, Adorno’s analysis depends on a 
dichotomous distinction between the ego and impulse. Yet it could be argued that 
this distinction that is assumed throughout the examination of freedom is in fact 
questionable and unconvincing. Finally, even if these first two objections are met, 
the notion of the addendum remains somewhat inchoate, particularly when we 
begin to look beyond only isolated moments of decision-making, and instead at 
the relation that holds between freedom and moral philosophy and a more general 
concern with social freedom. 
 
Firstly, then, Adorno’s contention that freedom requires both reason and impulse 
tells us little about impulses. So far, it has been established that impulse is not 
simply the same thing as a reflex, because unlike the latter, Adorno conceives of 
impulses as interacting with consciousness. Adorno further claims that there is 
something involuntary about impulses, which he equates with irrationality; 
 
‘Because of its involuntary nature there is something irrational about this 
adjustment that theories of freedom generally refuse to acknowledge but which is 
part of the definition of freedom.’119 
 
As was mentioned earlier, the idea that our experience of impulse has an 
involuntary moment need not be viewed as incompatible with the notion of 
freedom. Rather, the experience of involuntariness demonstrates to us the way in 
which we are dependent on – but not necessarily wholly determined by – nature. 
In this way we can begin to move away from the idea of a free individual who is 
able to somehow exist as a rational and self-determining agent removed from other 
influences, and rather understand the way in which we are determined by actual 
empirical conditions.  What Adorno regards to be the narcissism implicit within 
the Kantian notion of the freedom as existing in an intelligible realm can thus be 
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overcome.120 Adorno asserts that an ‘intractable’ problem of Kant’s conception of 
human nature lies in his attempt to ‘differentiate it…and mark it off from 
animality’121. According to Adorno, the notion of freedom as it has been 
developed by Kant and others is motivated by a particular urge; that is, to provide 
substantial theoretical evidence to show humanity as being distinct from mere 
animals. As we have seen, in Kant’s bid to arrive at a conception of human 
freedom that aims to demarcate human qua rational beings from mere animality, 
anything pertaining to the natural world is cleansed from the will. Adorno’s 
emphasis on the involuntary moment of the impulse thus need not signify a form 
of unfreedom but rather the acceptance on the part of the subject of the way in 
which they are – to an extent at least – a part of the natural [and social] world. 
 
Furthermore, according to Adorno, the problem is that we have come to view 
reason as entirely distinct from our natural drives and impulses. In fact, however, 
he regards reason itself to have its origins in drives.122 Given this, something like 
the impulse only appears to us as ‘otherness’ because of the abstraction of 
Kantian-type conceptions of the will. Thus, in fact, the addendum itself is not ‘as 
alien to reason as it would seem’.123 This is important because it shows that 
Adorno does not conceive of impulses as necessarily opposed to reason. It might 
be, that, given the way certain forms of rationality have developed, instincts and 
drives come to appear to be increasingly separate from our rational capacities, but 
this need not – and should not – be the case. However, it could be objected that, 
while freedom might indeed entail the experience of impulse, surely the 
experience of certain impulses would not lead to anything resembling freedom. It 
is easy to think of various impulses that we experience that are in no clear sense 
free. This would suggest that, in order to be convincing, Adorno would have to say 
more about which particular impulses are compatible with freedom, and which are 
not, yet no such elaborations are made in his treatment of the subject. The 
rejoinder could be that theoretical consciousness could perhaps weed out 
inappropriate impulses that would lead to unfreedom. What we would then require 
is an account of the way in which impulses can be controlled or restricted by 
theoretical consciousness. Of course, Adorno’s idea is that, in a world in which 
real freedom was actualised, the impulses could be integrated with reason, and 
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they would therefore not have to be controlled or dominated.124 This then suggests 
the possibility that impulses could only lead to freedom if the social conditions 
were different. 
 
However, Adorno should not be understood as viewing freedom to consist in the 
untrammelled and chaotic expression of instinctual responses to the world that 
occur with no unifying, centralising authority. Following traditional 
psychoanalytic theory, Adorno conceives of the ego as having the function of 
controlling impulse. Yet what is problematic is that, whilst Adorno seems to hold 
the ego to be in some sense necessary in order that the subject can be said to be 
free, he simultaneously presents the ego as something that ought to be regarded as 
possessing a largely repressive function. We are left with a problematic conception 
of the role of the ego in relation to freedom. On the one hand it is a necessary 
unifying feature, and is in fact the reason the subject begins to ascribe to himself 
the attribute of freedom in the first place, yet on the other hand it seems to be the 
source of the unfreedom of the subject. If Adorno is to be convincing in his 
analysis, this contradiction must be examined in greater detail. 
 
Adorno offers his clearest examination of the role of the ego in a lecture entitled 
‘Antinomies of Freedom’.  Firstly, he returns to the idea found throughout his 
work that, as the ego obtains increasing control over the subject, it begins to find 
what would constitute freedom – the archaic impulse –  questionable precisely 
because of its instinctual element. This would then seem to imply that there is a 
correlative decline of freedom when the ego gains mastery of the diverse impulses. 
In fact, however, it is not so simple. Adorno states; 
 
‘while something like freedom becomes possible only through the development of 
consciousness, at the same time this very development of consciousness 
effectively ensures that freedom is pushed back into the realm of archaic, mimetic 
impulse that is so essential to it.’125 
 
Thus, the very concept of freedom contains a conflict. While something like the 
ego is necessary for the concept itself to arise, the actual development and 
strengthening of the ego results in the experience of less freedom. What is not 
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clear about this passage is what Adorno means by freedom being in some sense 
‘pushed back’. One possible interpretation is that, rather than there being properly 
integrated, the archaic or mimetic impulse is wrongly separated from 
consciousness, which results in freedom itself being inaccessible to the subject 
whose vigilant ego keeps in check anything that it deems to be chaotic in order to 
secure self-preservation.126 This is the idea that the concept of freedom has its 
roots in a narcissistic urge on the part of the subject as a result of the fact that the 
ego ‘has enormous difficulty in grasping the elements of its own dependency.’127 
In order to become an individual, it is necessary for the subject to ‘insulate against 
the consciousness of its own entanglement in general’ and thus arrive at a 
conception of itself as free and independent from other subjects.128 Adorno thus 
seems to think two things are going on. Firstly, the ego – fearing that the 
expression of impulse will culminate in a dissolution of the self – suppresses 
impulses by subjecting them to a centralising control. It thus prevents the subject 
from experiencing those aspects of itself that would in fact be at least in part 
constitutive parts of a possible freedom. The actual experience of freedom is thus 
to an extent prevented by the ego. Secondly, however, in order to regard itself as 
somehow removed from the plethora of other beings that in fact determine the 
subject, the ego instead arrives at a narcissistic and abstract conception of itself as 
being free from the actual social context in which it finds itself and ‘obscures the 
fact of its own dependence.’129 
 
Adorno’s conception of the ego, then, is of something that works coercively on the 
external world and the subject in order to secure for itself some semblance of the 
independence that the social context in which it exists denies it. Yet it is 
simultaneously unconscious of its own coercive nature. Furthermore, the ego did 
in fact originate as a ‘counterweight’ to social coercion, yet eventually ends by 
dominating the subject and blinding him to his actual dependency on social 
externality. This is the dialectic of freedom, then, in which what originally serves 
to protect the subject against social domination actually ends up by dominating the 
subject. The addendum is thus in part conceived of as an answer to the ego’s 
dominion over the subject. This is why Adorno characterises the experience of the 
additional factor as a kind of ‘anamnesis’; what must be recalled is an earlier time 
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at which the self was not only dominated by the centralising authority of the ego 
whose intention is to subject the impulse to strict control. 
 
A possible rejoinder to Adorno’s conception of the relation that holds between 
freedom and the ego is to dispute the idea of the ego as possessing only a 
repressive function. While it is not within the scope of this examination to arrive at 
an alternative conception of the role of the ego, it is useful to bring to bear several 
considerations that might lead us to reconsider the persuasiveness of Adorno’s 
account. Firstly, it seems that Adorno’s conception of the interplay between the 
ego and impulses is somewhat simplistic. We might wish to challenge the 
dichotomy that Adorno establishes between the idea of the ego as a centralising 
force that dominates and suppresses natural impulses. Instead, we might think that 
the ego itself has natural origins, and that Adorno wrongly opposes reason [the 
ego] with nature [the impulses].  Yet Adorno foresees this objection and actually 
speculates that the ego itself might have its origins in libidinous energy, which 
means that the ego is not itself ‘absolutely alien’ to the additional factor.130  After 
all, Adorno regards the ego itself to be the product of ‘material existence’131 and to 
have evolved from human drives.132 The implication of this is that, while there is 
no necessary dichotomy between impulses and the ego, and the ego might have 
originated as an impulse, over time the ego develops in such a way as to take on 
the role of a kind of overseer of impulse. This is highly speculative 
metapsychology, but importantly, it does suggest that Adorno does not view the 
ego as something which is necessarily entirely removed from impulses. 
 
Yet Adorno’s characterisation of the ego can be further challenged, in particular, 
his suggestion that the ego has developed in such a way that its function is largely 
coercive. While it might be the case that the ego does act coercively on the 
external world and the subject by expunging or supressing the experience of 
impulse, it might not always operate in this way. This is a point made by 
Whitebook, when he suggests that the problem lies in the way Adorno conflates 
the ‘obsessional ego’ with the ego as such.133 The idea is that Adorno treats the 
ego as if it were by its very nature something that is coercive, and he thus neglects 
to consider ways of understanding the ego as something that often is integrated 
with impulse. Whitebook cites the psychoanalyst Loewald, who distinguishes 
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between ‘psychic processes that dam up, countercathect instinctual life and 
processes that channel and organise it.’134 What this points to is the necessity of 
making a distinction between ego activity that suppresses instincts, and ego 
activity that rather seeks to structure instincts. This points to an understanding of 
the ego – and therefore of the subject – that does not involve a clear dichotomy 
between impulse and ego, but rather the possibility that there are different ways by 
which the ego interacts with impulse. It could then be argued that Adorno is wrong 
to view the ego only as a source of unfreedom, and it would further point to an 
increased potentiality of freedom for the subject. A more nuanced account of 
impulse could then be formulated that would go beyond the dichotomy that 
Adorno posits. This would imply that Adorno’s diagnosis of the potentialities of 
freedom is more pessimistic than it needs to be. 
 
However, it is possible to arrive at a response on Adorno’s behalf. After all, 
Loewald’s distinction between processes that dam up instinctual life and processes 
that channel and organise it can be accepted by Adorno. Yet he could still claim, 
that, while it might be the case that the ego need not only act coercively on the 
instincts and that it thus has the potential to integrate more harmoniously with 
impulse, because of the way in which it has developed as a result of contingent 
socio-economic factors in human history, the ego is most often experienced as 
damming up instinctual life. Thus, while it is not necessarily the case that the ego 
acts coercively on the subject and therefore prevents the self-experience of 
freedom, because of the way in which society has come to exist, this is the way in 
which it tends to operate. It is the coercive aspect of society that is mirrored by the 
ego when it seeks only to repress instincts rather than integrate or channel them. 
Thus, the ego ought to be regarded as a source of unfreedom as a result of our 
current social structure, rather than because it is intrinsically coercive. The only 
problem with this rejoinder is that it ignores the way in which Adorno does seem 
to hold that the duality by which the ego is both necessary for freedom and yet 
eventually prevents the subject from experiencing freedom, is in fact ‘integral to 
the concept of freedom’.135 This suggests that the contradiction is not simply a 
contingent fact, but rather a contradiction that cannot be eliminated: the conflict is 
inherent within the notion of freedom. This is borne out in remarks found in 
Negative Dialectics, in which Adorno claims that freedom only arises concurrently 
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with repression.136 Without a unified self, there would be no entity that could 
experience freedom, yet this unified self, in order to remain unified, must then 
curb actual freedom. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks: The Addendum & The Self-Experience of Freedom 
 
Adorno’s bid to re-orient freedom thus centres on the idea of the existence of a 
physical impulse in the act of willing itself. Contra Kant, the self-experience of 
freedom must involve both a somatic moment and a theoretical consciousness. 
This leads to a re-evaluation of the relation that holds between reason and nature. 
Adorno’s contention is that freedom entails an awareness of our dependency on 
nature, rather than viewing nature as something to be dominated. This explains 
why he holds that the addendum itself contains a moment of involuntary 
adjustment to that which lies outside the subject. However, many forms of 
involuntary adjustment are not instances of freedom but the opposite: Adorno 
holds that, in modern societies, we continually conform to social pressures in such 
a way that is entirely unfree. By contrast, the addendum entails a new kind of 
relation to externality in which subjects are able to go beyond the limits of a purely 
theoretical consciousness. I have argued that Adorno can successfully maintain 
that the addendum can be regarded as distinct from a reflex and yet still immediate 
without falling in to contradiction. I have also suggested that, while it is true that 
Adorno does not provide a clear assessment of which physical impulses could be 
constitutive components of free agency, he does not conceive of freedom as 
consisting in the expression of any impulse without the existence of a mechanism 
by which these impulses are vetted. Rather, he views the ego as a necessary 
component of the historical development of freedom, without which freedom 
could not exist, and yet also as something that in fact limits the self-experience of 
freedom by the subject. 
 
However, while Adorno can be said to begin to point to an alternative conception 
of free agency, many ambiguities and problems remain. It seems that whilst the 
notion of a jolt is suggestive of a new kind of way of understanding agency, it 
remains unclear how this would help us in thinking about the relation between 
freedom and moral agency.  This is particularly true when we look beyond the 
self-experience of freedom in decision-making, and instead at how we can begin to 
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reconcile the addendum with a concern for social freedom. Adorno seems to hold 
the experience of physical impulses to be integral to a new understanding of the 
way in which we should act upon the world. Yet it is not clear what relation this 
holds to the physical impulse that is constitutive of free agency. This needs to be 
explored in greater detail if the addendum is to be a candidate for a new model of 
freedom. Furthermore, what is confusing is that Adorno’s remarks on social 
freedom tend to focus on economic and technological factors rather than impulses. 
If Adorno is to re-orient our conception of freedom, a link between these two 
approaches must be outlined. 
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III 
IMPULSE, RESISTANCE, AND FREEDOM 
 
 
 
At the end of the last chapter, I suggested that it is unclear how the addendum 
relates to moral agency, if at all. In this chapter, I will examine what Adorno refers 
to in Negative Dialectics as ‘the moral addendum’, and its relation to the account 
of willing found in the last chapter. I will begin by establishing how we ought to 
view the connection between the two. A concern that arises is that, what may seem 
appealing in speaking of the self-experience of freedom – that is, the moment at 
which we experience the impulse – becomes more troublesome when discussing 
moral agency. In particular, I will argue that we may find Adorno’s emphasis on 
the immediacy required for moral action to be problematic for a number of 
reasons. This will lead me on to discuss the role played by the notion of resistance 
in Adorno’s moral philosophy, and the way in which resistance could be 
understood to be a form of negative freedom. In recent literature, the idea that 
Adorno arrives at an ‘ethics of resistance’ has gained currency, yet little has been 
said about how this relates to his understanding of freedom. 
 
I The Moral Addendum 
In Negative Dialectics Adorno famously claims that a new version of Kant’s 
categorical imperative has been ‘imposed’ by Hitler upon an ‘unfree’ mankind; 
‘to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so 
that nothing similar will happen.’137 
Adorno’s re-formulation of the categorical imperative has been the subject of 
extensive discussion, and a detailed examination of its import is beyond the 
bounds of this work. However, several things should be noted. Firstly, Adorno’s 
imperative is historically oriented and as such opposed to the supposed 
timelessness of Kant’s categorical imperative. Morality – like freedom – can only 
be meaningfully discussed with reference to actual historical events. Like Hegel, 
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Adorno is precisely critical of the formalism of Kant’s formulation of the 
categorical imperative, and its neglect of actually existing socio-historical 
conditions. However, Adorno suggests that because of the formalism and 
universality of Kant’s categorical imperative, there remains in it something 
substantial; what Adorno refers to as the ‘egalitarian idea.’138 It is universally 
binding and, as such, treats individuals as equal unlike subsequent philosophies or 
ideologies that base themselves on what Adorno refers to as ‘substantial-
qualitative differences.’139 Furthermore, events such as Auschwitz show that 
Hegel’s critique of Kantian formalism – bound up as it is with the idea that an 
ethical life has in fact concretely been realised – does not offer an alternative way 
of conceiving of morality or freedom. Whilst Hegel is in a sense right to denounce 
the formalistic aspect of Kantian morality, Adorno thinks that supposedly rational 
social institutions do not in fact offer the forum for ethical existence, and nor do 
forms of communality necessarily avoid the perpetuation of horror.  
A further striking feature of the imperative is that Adorno claims that the 
imperative is imposed on an unfree mankind. This again forms a direct inversion 
of Kant, who claims that the categorical imperative is an expression of the 
freedom of humanity. However, the unfree mankind on whom this imperative is 
imposed also has the potential to arrange its thoughts and actions. Thus, a state of 
unfreedom for Adorno does not entail that individuals have no possibility 
whatsoever of determining the way in which they exist.140  What these possibilities 
consist in will be the subject of discussion later in the chapter. To return to the re-
formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative, Adorno goes on to state that; 
‘Dealing discursively with it would be an outrage, for the new imperative gives us 
a bodily sensation of the moral addendum – bodily, because it is now the practical 
abhorrence of the unbearable physical agony to which individuals are exposed…It 
is in the unvarnished materialistic motive only that morality survives.’141 
Morality, like freedom, requires the experience of an impulse or sensation, and 
resides in the subject’s sympathetic response to the suffering of another that is in 
part somatic. In another passage Adorno suggests that imperatives such as ‘No 
man should be tortured’ are only true as impulse. In fact, he equates the impulse 
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with ‘naked physical fear’ and solidarity with physical bodies.142 Moreover, he 
argues that these sorts of claims should not be rationalised, because this would 
compromise the urgency with which they are felt, and render them in to questions 
for theory. Adorno’s point is that we must precisely be able to momentarily 
suspend our theoretical consciousness in order that we can take on the kind of 
attitude that would allow us to experience the bodily sensation of the moral 
addendum. 
What is unclear is the connection that holds between the freedom impulse and 
moral impulse if, that is, Adorno holds such a connection to exist at all, a question 
posed by O’Connor.143 Importantly, Adorno refers to a ‘moral’ addendum. But is 
this the same addendum that was the subject of discussion earlier? Adorno accords 
the physical moment that we experience when confronted by suffering a normative 
dimension that is not clearly present in the self-experience of the freedom impulse. 
In the section ‘Concepts and Categories’ of Negative Dialectics, Adorno states 
that, when we are faced with suffering, the physical moment that we experience 
‘tells our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that things should be 
different.’144 The moral addendum has a normative dimension because the 
physical experience that we undergo gives us the reason to arrange our thoughts 
and actions to prevent the recurrence of Auschwitz. Morality involves a 
responsiveness to suffering that is both physical – it is a bodily sensation that 
involves the ‘practical abhorrence of…unbearable physical agony’145 – and yet 
also involves the arrangement of our conscious thoughts in the face of horror with 
which we are confronted. As with the freedom impulse, there is a clear interaction 
between the physical and the mental, or inner and outer. But can anything more be 
said about the connection between the experience of freedom and morality beyond 
this rudimentary outline? 
 
Firstly, it should be pointed out that the centrality Adorno accords to suffering in 
his moral philosophy bears a significant resemblance to Schopenhauer’s ethics of 
compassion. This similitude in fact goes some way in elucidating what the 
freedom impulse and the moral impulse might have in common. Thus, following 
his critique of Kantian morality in ‘The Foundation of Ethics’,  Schopenhauer 
claims that, a ‘true’ incentive for justice requires something that is not only 
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abstract and concept-based, but rather ‘something resting merely on intuitive 
apprehension’ that forces itself ‘immediately on us out of the reality of objects.’146 
As with Adorno’s conception of the self-experience of freedom, the suggestion is 
that, in order to have a moral response to something, what is required is a certain 
kind of heteronomous and alien element that is external to the subject somehow 
forcing itself on to them, an experience which would entail the subject’s 
possessing the right kind of receptivity to this externality. Furthermore, 
Schopenhauer suggests that we are moved by the suffering of another through a 
process of identification with them. He states; 
 
‘…the barrier between the ego and non-ego is for the moment abolished, only then 
do the other man’s needs…directly become my own.’147 
 
Schopenhauer argues that the subject’s identification with the suffering of another 
requires a momentary overcoming of the ego. In his own account of the moral 
addendum, Adorno does not explicitly state that our experience of the impulse 
when faced with suffering would involve this type of overcoming. Yet the way in 
which Adorno describes the self-experience of freedom is reminiscent of 
Schopenhauer’s claim; as was discussed earlier, Adorno suggests that freedom 
originates in the experience of an ‘archaic impulse’ that precedes the existence of a 
‘solid I’. Furthermore, the idea that we experience a bodily sensation when faced 
with the suffering of another would imply that a momentary suspension of the 
‘solid I’ would also be required in order for the subject to be fully able to 
temporarily suspend their usual concerns and instead immediately respond to the 
suffering of the other. Thus, both the experience of morality and the experience of 
freedom require a moment – brought about by the impulse – at which the subject 
no longer distinguishes rigidly between the I and the not I, and allows itself to be 
flooded by externality. 
 
It should be pointed out that Adorno does not advocate a Schopenhauerian-type 
ethics of compassion, and he follows Nietzsche’s assessment of the pitfalls of such 
an ethics. While it is true that Adorno’s re-formulation of the imperative does 
require of individuals a responsiveness to suffering that involves a momentary 
suspension of their usual, rational concerns, Adorno does not think that this is 
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sufficient. An ethics of compassion wrongly suggests that this kind of immediate, 
non-egoistic response should be the ‘main foundation’ of a moral doctrine, and as 
such, Adorno thinks that the idea of compassion ‘tacitly maintains and gives its 
sanction to the negative condition of powerlessness in which the object of pity 
finds himself.’148 As in Mann’s ‘Tobias Mindernickel’, in which the character 
Tobias is only happy when he can respond to the suffering or plight of another, 
and seeks to maintain the conditions under which his dog suffers in order that he 
can respond compassionately149, Adorno thinks that advocating an ethics based on 
compassion might serve to perpetuate the conditions in which suffering is 
inflicted. Thus, while we should inculcate this kind of responsiveness in ourselves, 
compassion cannot in itself be the source or grounding of an ethics, as it only leads 
to the perpetuation of the sources of suffering.  
 
To return to the similarities between the moral impulse and the freedom impulse, it 
seems that both involve a form of mimetic behaviour, which, as was briefly 
mentioned in chapter two, Adorno defines as behaviour that is not ‘causally 
determined by objective factors, but involves instead an involuntary adjustment to 
something extramental.’150 It seems that a kind of mimesis occurs in both the self-
experience of freedom, and in the experience of the physical impulse that moves 
us to action as a response to suffering. Adorno often employs the notion of 
mimetic behaviour in his philosophy, which he defines as a form of ‘archaic 
comportment that as an immediate practice…is not knowledge.’151 Free and moral 
practice requires a pre-theoretical attitude on the part of the subject that would 
enable them to escape the confines of the fully rational self, and instead allow for a 
moment in which there does not exist a subject/object dualism, and instead what 
Jay refers to as a ‘non-coercive relation of affinity between non-identical 
particulars.’152 Jay further claims that Adorno conceives of mimesis as necessarily 
entailing a role for the body in the interaction between the self and the world.153 
Both the self-experience of freedom and the experience of morality seem to be 
forms of mimesis, as both require the individual to have a kind of ‘archaic 
openness’154 to what is other to it, and precede strictly cognitive attitudes on the 
part of the subject towards the object via the experience of an impulse. This has a 
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further implication. That is, that what blocks freedom – the strict individuation of 
the ego –also blocks what Adorno holds to be the appropriate moral response to 
suffering; that is, ‘the practical abhorrence of the unbearable physical agony to 
which individuals are exposed…’. This is not only because the ego acts coercively 
on what is other to it, although this is one reason. It is also because the strict 
demarcation of the ego from what is other to it prevents the subject from being 
able to have the kind of relation to externality that would allow it to experience the 
bodily sensation of the moral addendum. Such a sensation would precisely require 
the suspension of the claims of the ego, and an adjustment to the extramental that 
in Schopenhauer’s ethics is termed ‘the reality of objects.’ 
 
One question that might arise that was briefly mentioned in chapter two is whether 
or not Adorno is right to lay heavy weight on the notion of mimetic forms of 
behaviour. What is striking is that Adorno suggests that mimetic behaviour can, to 
an extent, be understood as somehow removed from the objective conditions at 
play in society as a whole. However, given how entrenched we are in the 
pernicious forces at play in contemporary society, it seems hopeful to suggest that 
mimetic behaviour is something that could remain independent of these forces. 
There are two responses that partly allay this objection. Firstly, as Bowie points 
out, Adorno is sometimes guilty of overplaying and exaggerating the totalising 
aspect of modern society.155 Thus, as I suggested in chapter two, Adorno can still 
be read as holding some non-mediated responses to be possible. Of course, this is 
not a fully satisfactory answer to the question, but, it does seem that Adorno’s 
emphasis on the physical and immediate derives from his sense that, in mimetic 
behaviour, there is still a possibility for forms of responsiveness to the plight of 
others open to the subject. Secondly, forms of mimetic behaviour are, it seems, 
largely possibilities rather than actualities. Otherwise, we would not have need of 
a new formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative. The point, then, is that, while 
responses to suffering should simply occur as aspects of our natural, bodily 
agency, as a result of the dominance of instrumental rationality, of which 
Auschwitz is the terrible culmination, we must be reminded that actual morality – 
and freedom – has a physical, natural origin. Thus, mimetic behaviour is to a large 
extent blocked by objective conditions, and should not thus be conceived of as a 
mystical force at play in society that allows subjects to transcend their rational 
selves. 
                                                                                                                                                  
154 The Semblance of Subjectivity, p.7 
  
56 
56 
 
What more can be said about the connection between the experience of impulse 
and moral action? In chapter two, I briefly discussed Adorno’s re-interpretation of 
Kant’s concept of spontaneity, which he claims inadvertently points to the duality 
that exists between ego and impulse and further suggests that freedom requires 
both the unity of consciousness and an involuntary response to the external. In 
‘The Problems of Moral Philosophy’, Adorno suggests that spontaneity is also a 
key element to understanding what occurs in moral practice, which requires the 
‘immediate, active reaction to particular situations.’156 He illustrates this with a 
story of a man involved in the July 20 plot, whose motivation for taking part in the 
assassination attempt lay in the intolerability of the situation in which he found 
himself. Regardless of any consequence, he felt himself compelled to take action. 
Adorno suggests that this is illustrative of the moment of moral action that 
contains an ‘irrational’ aspect that is experienced additionally to the subject’s 
theoretical consciousness of the situation. 
 
However, we might wish to exercise caution before accepting the role of the 
additional factor in our moral lives. Firstly, there is the obvious concern that the 
experience of the physical, irrational moment157 that moves one to action might 
not be a good way of deciding questions of morality. It is easy to envisage 
situations in which we might experience an impulse that causes us to respond 
disproportionately, or to elect the wrong course of action. Yet this objection 
ignores the crucial role that theoretical consciousness plays for Adorno. Moral 
practice requires both a theoretical consciousness and the experience of a moment 
that goes beyond this consciousness and is instead a direct response to the 
situation at hand. It is not the case that a moral response to situations manifests 
itself only as an immediate reaction to events without the involvement of the 
subject’s critical capacities; this would amount to ‘activity for its own sake’ that 
remains ‘stuck fast within a given reality.’158 Knowledge is necessary to bring the 
subject ‘to the point of action’ yet the additional factor that is ‘alien’ to matters of 
moral philosophy is required to move the subject to action. The irrational aspect of 
moral action occurs as an addition to theory; the man involved in the assassination 
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plot is only brought to his action by the knowledge that he possesses; ‘if he had 
had no knowledge of the vile evil…he would quite certainly have never been 
moved to that act.’159 By suggesting of moral action that it requires an irrational 
moment, Adorno thus does not have in mind that moral action is solely guided by 
impulsive responses to suffering. The principle idea is that theoretical insight 
alone does not lead to moral practice, just as theoretical consciousness alone does 
not constitute freedom. 
 
However, even if we accept that Adorno’s re-interpretation of Kantian 
spontaneity, this does not eliminate the sense that such a notion is insufficiently 
rigorous as a way of re-conceptualising our experience of the moral. When it 
comes to moral action, it might again strike us as problematical that Adorno places 
emphasis on the kind of situational immediacy of response that he otherwise holds 
to be suspect. Even if we accept that the irrational aspect that spurs us on to action 
is coupled or experienced with a theoretical consciousness, in a wholly integrated 
and radically evil society, it is difficult to place much faith in this form of 
situational response. The danger is that Adorno begins to treat moral practice as 
though it were in some sense self-evident by over-relying on the moment at which 
the individual is moved to action by the additional factor. Yet Adorno is opposed 
to the idea that the moral is in some sense given; he often suggests that the 
complexity with which we are confronted in modern society in the realm of 
practice makes any action that we take mired in ambiguity as his repeated 
emphasis on the lack of moral certainty demonstrates.160 Thus, given the extent to 
which Adorno thinks that we are victims of false consciousness in modern day 
societies, how can we trust the fact that we are even capable of the right kind of 
impulse? A turn to what Adorno describes as the ‘true primal phenomenon of 
moral behaviour’161 is dangerously close to simply advocating the kind of 
irrationalism that Adorno supposedly opposes. 
 
This worry is coupled with the fact that Adorno uses as an example a situation that 
is ‘intolerable’, in which the subject is compelled to act because of the horror of 
the Third Reich. Yet most situations in which we find ourselves do not possess 
this intolerable quality. In fact, this latter point leads us to a further concern. It can 
perhaps be accepted that, in circumstances resembling the example employed by 
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Adorno – a situation in which the subject is confronted with the perpetuation of 
horrifying acts – we would experience a moment at which we were moved to 
action by something resembling an additional factor. However, it is more difficult 
to understand how this moment would manifest itself in more commonplace and 
quotidian circumstances that might still call for moral action, or in situations that 
call for subtle and long term change, where suffering might not be of the kind to 
elicit a somatic response. How, if at all, does the notion of the addendum – both in 
the experience of morality and the experience of freedom – lead to the kind of 
radical social change that Adorno quite clearly holds to be desirable? If it cannot 
be shown that there is a convincing connection to be drawn between the subject’s 
experience of the additional factor and a concern for social freedom in general, 
then, contrary to Adorno’s aims, the idea of the addendum – and his conception of 
freedom more generally – becomes increasingly ineffectual and abstract. 
 
The first question, then, is whether or not Adorno can retain the primacy of the 
addendum in his account of freedom, whilst offering a convincing way of thinking 
about social freedom. This brings us to a second, more general question. That is, 
does Adorno offer a convincing way of thinking about social freedom at all? Of 
course, it can be responded that Adorno need not provide an account of social 
freedom precisely because he holds that such a thing is not possible in 
contemporary society, and given the prevalence of false consciousness, it is not 
even possible to imagine a society that would be free. Yet this response is not only 
unsatisfactory from the point of view of moral philosophy in general, but it also 
ignores the fact that Adorno does, throughout his work, provide remarks that 
suggest a way of understanding how he might conceive of social freedom. 
However, in order to evaluate Adorno’s claims, a distinction should be made 
between on the one hand, how it is that he thinks freedom manifests itself in an 
unfree society, and on the other hand, what actual social freedom or autonomy 
would require. It is the first question that the rest of the chapter will focus on via 
an examination of the notion of resistance. 
 
II Resistance as negative freedom 
 
In recent literature, it has often been argued that Adorno’s idea of resistance is 
crucial to his philosophy as a whole. For Adorno, the right kind of art exhibits 
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resistance to the negative whole, and individuals themselves can exhibit resistance 
by pursuing certain modes of behaviour. The term ‘ethics of resistance’ has been 
coined in order to denote the negative yet [arguably] normatively binding 
injunctions that appear throughout Adorno’s philosophy. This is a useful way of 
thinking about Adorno’s moral philosophy, because it rightly defends Adorno 
from the charge that his philosophy leaves us with no practical guidance as to what 
we can and ought to do in the modern social world. 
 
Furthermore, a passage from Negative Dialectics points to the idea that resistance 
is also central to Adorno’s conception of freedom; ‘Freedom turns concrete in the 
changing forms of repression, as resistance to repression.’162 However, the risk is 
that – without a good deal of explication – this claim amounts to little more than a 
slogan. I will begin by suggesting a way in which the concept of resistance can 
form a bridge between the addendum and social freedom in general. I will then 
examine in greater detail Adorno’s conception of negative freedom, and what 
resistance to repression might look like. I will end by considering a concern that 
arises from the notion of an ethics of resistance that suggests a problematical 
tension within Adorno’s philosophy. 
 
In the previous section, I suggested that an objection to the additional factor is that 
it is unclear how it relates to a more general concern with social freedom. One 
kind of response might be that, given that the addendum involves forms of 
behaviour that are receptive and open to externality, it is clear that it necessarily 
has a social dimension. But this response remains inchoate, and tells us nothing 
about the way in which the addendum might if not point to an account of social 
freedom, at least point to a way in which it relates to social concerns. A more 
promising answer lies in Adorno’s conception of resistance. To return to the 
passage in which Adorno discusses the assassination attempt, Adorno holds the 
man’s action to manifest spontaneity, because it is comprised of an active and 
immediate response to the situation, and contains an involuntary moment. Yet 
there is also something else going on, that is, that through this spontaneity, the 
man exhibits resistance to the situation. It seems that, for Adorno, the moment of 
individual resistance when the man acts spontaneously entails the aspect of the 
moral that is left out by theory. He claims that this is the ‘precise point at which 
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the irrationality, or better, the irrational aspect of moral action is to be sought…’163 
The connection between spontaneity and resistance could be construed as follows, 
then. An individual is able to resist certain situations by performing acts that are 
both informed by a theoretical consciousness and yet retain an immediacy to them, 
and are in this manner spontaneous. This goes some way in explaining what 
Adorno means when he claims that freedom is now experienced as resistance to 
repression. In acts of resistance, we might experience a freedom that is otherwise 
denied to us via the involuntary moment that compels within us a response to the 
situation. One question is whether resistance always requires spontaneity or the 
additional factor. In many passages, Adorno seems to say that resistance can be 
displayed without any action at all, and it is enough to develop a theoretical 
consciousness that focuses on the bad. Yet perhaps the forms of thought in which 
a highly developed theoretical consciousness partakes in could also be understood 
to possess a kind of impulse that moves them to criticise the existing status quo. 
This is highly speculative, but it does seem that Adorno might hold such a view 
given that he characterises thinking as a form of behaviour.164 
 
Another important aspect of freedom understood as resistance to repression is that, 
contra Kant, it entails that freedom is necessarily located within the empirical 
realm of practice, and is thus directly opposed to the idea of an intelligible realm 
beyond the empirical in which we are free. As was discussed in the first chapter, 
Adorno holds that an adequate account of freedom must show the way in which 
freedom alters throughout history rather than attempting to isolate timeless 
features of the concept. However, as was mentioned earlier, while Adorno does 
think that freedom is above all a historical category, and thus an idea that 
undergoes a variety of shifting forms throughout history, this does not mean that 
freedom becomes a relative concept with no ‘permanent component’.  
 
For Adorno, the concrete possibilities for freedom in late capitalism are limited to 
forms of resistance, and thus a freedom that can be ‘defined in negation only, 
corresponding to the concrete form of a specific unfreedom.’165 Freedom is 
inextricably linked to its opposite; that is, unfreedom or repression; 
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‘The subject would be liberated only as an I reconciled with the not-I, and thus it 
would be also above freedom insofar as freedom is leagued with its counterpart, 
repression.’166 
 
Just as the self-experience of freedom actually requires the coercive ego, the 
individual can only be said to act freely if he opposes himself to forms of 
heteronomy. Free action does not exist as an independent phenomena, but 
materialises only as a response to existing forms of repression.  This passage 
points to a further aspect of Adorno’s account; that is, that he holds actual 
liberation to require ‘reconciliation’ rather than freedom. The idea seems to be 
that, unlike freedom, a state of reconciliation, would not require a concurrent state 
of repression or unfreedom. Little else can be said about what a state of 
reconciliation would look like given that nothing close to it has materialised in 
human history. 
 
As Freyenhagen points out, in arriving at a freedom that can be defined in negation 
only, Adorno thereby in part accepts Kant’s distinction between negative and 
positive freedom.167 For Kant, negative freedom is ‘independence from all material 
of the law’, whilst positive freedom is the ‘intrinsic legislation of pure and thus 
practical reason.’168 As has been shown, Adorno accuses Kant’s conception of 
negative freedom of wrongly suggesting both that we can be free from 
determination by our own desires and impulses, and that such a state would be 
desirable. The addendum as an account of the self-experience of freedom opposes 
precisely this view. However, Adorno does think that, while we cannot currently 
achieve anything resembling positive freedom or autonomy, a kind of negative 
freedom might exist in the subject’s attempts to preserve some infinitesimal 
independence from societal heteronomy via resistance. 
 
If it is true that negative freedom resides in our ability to resist, more needs to be 
said about the way in which Adorno conceives of these modes of resistance, and to 
further point out what might be deemed questionable about such an approach to 
freedom. Firstly, then, resistance in general for Adorno denotes the possibility of 
individual opposition to the evil that characterises contemporary society; it means 
opposition to heteronomy and forms of thought and belief that are imposed from 
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without.169 To exhibit this form of opposition, the individual must possess a highly 
developed critical consciousness; 
 
‘We need to hold fast to moral norms, to self-criticism, to the question of right and 
wrong, and at the same time to a sense of the fallibility of the authority that has the 
confidence to undertake such self-criticism.’170 
 
In order to resist and be at least negatively free, then, the individual must be 
vigilant in two senses. Firstly, they must be critical of existing forms of unfreedom 
and social heteronomy that are transmitted by ideologies through cultural mediums 
and various institutions. There are numerous forms that such resistance could 
take.171 Secondly, however, the individual must also be self-critical and not 
consider himself removed from societal heteronomy and thus able to undertake a 
free-standing critique of society. In a sense negative freedom then entails an 
awareness of the limits of its own grounds. This is interesting because it recalls the 
earlier discussion of unfreedom of the individual within society in chapter two. To 
recap, the subject is externally unfree because of the way in which he is unable to 
determine his political, economic, and social existence. The subject is doubly 
unfree because of the way in which the ego internalises social coercion and 
mirrors this in both his internal processes and in the mode by which he acts on the 
world. The subject wrongly takes aspects of his ability to act coercively on the 
world to be illustrative of his independence from the rest of society. 
 
Thus, a key element of resistance is the need for the subject to be conscious of the 
way in which he is himself the product of a heteronomous social reality, and 
dependent on the context in which he finds himself. Without this kind of self-
knowledge, there can be no hope of undertaking the kind of criticism that could 
lead to a change that might signal the start of something resembling a positive self-
determination. Individuals stumble at the first block by regarding themselves to be 
able to undertake forms of critique without first realising the extent of their own 
entanglement and unfreedom. By claiming that the subject must be aware of the 
‘fallibility of the authority that undertakes self-criticism’, Adorno thereby implies 
that freedom is to be found precisely in the subject’s consciousness of the limits of 
his own ability to satisfactorily get outside of that which he seeks to criticise and 
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in instead gaining a critical insight in to why there is so little freedom; Adorno 
states that the fact that freedom ‘grows obsolete’ is a ‘fatality which resistance 
must clarify.’172 Adorno suggests that the intellectual might possess more freedom 
than others because he at least has a ‘glimpse’ into his own entanglement in the 
unfreedom of society.173 Whether or not this is true, the idea is that a certain 
amount of freedom can be found by being conscious of the multiple ways in which 
we are entangled and dependent on society. Just as the self-experience of freedom 
requires an anamnesis of our dependence on nature, negative freedom as resistance 
requires of us that we bring to consciousness our dependence on the social nexus. 
 
This illustrates one aspect of what has recently come to be known as Adorno’s 
‘ethics of resistance’, a term which has been used to refer to the various 
injunctions and prescriptions found throughout his works that involves what 
Finlayson describes as ‘strategies of self-conscious non-cooperation with 
institutionalized forms of social unfreedom and with prevailing norms and 
values.’174 The idea that Adorno arrives at a kind of ethics, despite his own 
scepticism about what the term ‘ethics’ implies, is a  response to critics who have 
accused Adorno of quietism in the face of his negative claims concerning the 
potentialities of individual existence in contemporary society. The advantages of 
such an approach to Adorno’s philosophy is that it collates together disperse 
claims and injunctions found throughout his work, that do in fact point to the 
possibility of moral practice in the contemporary world and thus the exercise of a 
negative freedom. Finlayson argues that Adorno implicitly holds that, in order for 
the individual to be able to partake in an ethics of resistance, three qualities are 
necessary; Mundigkeit, humility and affection.175 Importantly, the term 
‘Mundigkeit’ – translatable as autonomy – is a Kantian term that implies the 
capacity to use one’s understanding.176 Finlayson suggests that Adorno uses 
‘Mundigkeit’ to refer to a refusal by the subject to capitulate to heteronomously 
imposed norms. He points to a passage in ‘Education after Auschwitz’ in which 
Adorno states; 
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‘The single genuine power standing against the principle of Auschwitz is 
autonomy, if I might use a Kantian expression: the power of reflection, of self-
determination, of not cooperating.’177 
 
One way that Adorno thinks that we can foster or cultivate ‘Mundigkeit’ is 
precisely via education, by which he means both children’s education, but also a 
‘general enlightenment’ that would aim at changing the ‘state of consciousness.’178 
The aim of education is to make clear to individuals the way in which their 
consciousness might be manipulated, and demonstrate how the ego ‘is replaced in 
the name of bonds by…authorities’.179 This type of education would foster the 
individual’s awareness that could then lead to resistance. Reflection and non-
cooperation are thus crucial components of opposing the principle of Auschwitz, 
and ways in which our negative freedom is manifested. Non-cooperation might 
further entail spontaneity and the experience of the atheoretical moment of 
practice present in the attempted assassination plot. What this suggests is that 
Adorno’s account of negative freedom can be filled in with reference to certain 
patterns of behaviour that the subject is still able to undertake in contemporary 
society. More problematically, however, the claim suggests something else; that is, 
that some level of self-determination is a pre-requisite for preventing the forms of 
thought that led to an events like Auschwitz from occuring. Yet, as has been 
shown, in many parts of Adorno’s philosophy, the idea that we even can be self-
determining or autonomous is emphatically denied. The idea of autonomy has 
become a component part of ideology180, so it is puzzling that Adorno uncritically 
utilises it in the context of a discussion of Auschwitz. What should be made of this 
inclusion? 
 
A further objection that we might have to the idea of an ethics of resistance is that, 
by only emphasising the possibilities of individual resistance in society, Adorno 
thereby neglects to arrive at a conception of freedom that is sensitive to actual 
societal conditions. Given that he holds the Marxian view that freedom can only 
be achieved via the emancipation of the whole of society, and no individual 
freedom is possible, it could be objected that the focus on individual resistance 
obscures what should be of most importance; that is, the achievement of social 
freedom. What is problematic is that, Adorno claims that freedom can not be 
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understood as something ‘purely individual’; he regards such a view to be an 
‘abstraction.’181 In the same passage he goes on to say that thinking about freedom 
without reference to the rest of society has ‘no meaning at all’.182 Yet, for Adorno, 
the form that resistance takes is almost always only individual. Of course, it could 
be objected that, in order to partake in an ethics of resistance at all, the individual 
must be responsive to the general social context. Freyenhagen points to Adorno’s 
claim in ‘The Problems of Moral Philosophy’ that suggests that morality becomes 
the search for the right kind of politics183 to show that Adorno is principally 
concerned with social freedom. Yet, while this might be the case, we might still 
feel that more needs to be said about the kinds of conditions necessary for a 
freedom that would go beyond individual forms of resistance, and involve more 
widespread social change.  Adorno is by no means unaware of this tension in his 
conception of freedom, but whether or not he offers any plausible suggestions will 
form the subject of examination in the next chapter. 
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IV 
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM 
 
 
 
 
In the last chapter, I identified two possible problems with Adorno’s account of 
negative freedom. The first centered on the ambiguity surrounding Adorno’s use 
of ‘autonomy’. In certain passages Adorno talks about the possibility of 
individuals exercising autonomy in contemporary society. Other passages suggest 
that autonomy is not open to the subject at all. I will try to make sense of what 
Adorno might mean by autonomy. This will then lead on to a discussion of the 
social conditions under which autonomy understood as the subject’s positive self-
determination might be fully realisable. I will argue that, for Adorno, the 
fundamental difference between negative freedom and autonomy is that the latter 
is only fully realisable under economic conditions that are radically different to 
those found in late capitalist societies. This in turn might begin to answer the 
second worry raised in the last chapter; that is, that Adorno’s notion of resistance 
is problematically individualistic. I will further show how impulse might relate to 
Adorno’s broader claims concerning the realisation of a social freedom, and 
explicate the role played by Adorno’s notion of want in his account of social 
freedom. 
 
I: Autonomy in contemporary society 
 
There are two different ways of interpreting Adorno’s treatment of autonomy. The 
first is to read Adorno as claiming that autonomy in contemporary society consists 
in the exercise of negative freedom. On this view, resistance can be understood as 
a limited form of autonomy. This approach is found in O’Connor, who reads the 
passage in which Adorno claims that autonomy is the sole power by which the 
principle of Auschwitz is opposed as showing that Adorno holds autonomy to 
manifest itself in maintaining an oppositional attitude to various socio-cultural 
norms.184  However, O’Connor also claims that autonomy remains an objective in 
the development of a rational society that has yet to be fully realised.185 A second 
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approach is to interpret Adorno as holding autonomy to be a positive freedom of 
self-determination that is unavailable to us in late capitalist societies.186 It seems 
that the latter interpretation is broadly correct; not only does Adorno tend to think 
that the idea of autonomy is largely used in contemporary society for ideological 
purposes, as has been discussed, he does not think that we can hope for anything 
resembling positive self-determination. However, while this is true, passages like 
the one found in ‘Education after Auschwitz’ do seem to suggest that Adorno 
holds some [limited] autonomy to still be open to the individual. This is echoed in 
Adorno’s essay on ‘Free Time’, in which he suggests that full societal integration 
has yet to occur, and that, rather, the ‘real interests of individuals are still strong 
enough to resist…their total appropriation.’187 
 
The passage in which Adorno discusses the principle of Auschwitz is largely 
concerned with what Adorno holds to be the formation of pernicious social bonds, 
which he claims come about as a result of ‘heteronomy, a dependence on rules, on 
norms that cannot be justified by the individual’s own reason.’188 Autonomy is 
then invoked in contrast to these behaviours, as something that is opposed to the 
principle of Auschwitz and the unreflective formation of these bonds. What is 
striking is that, in this passage, Adorno implicitly accepts something bearing a 
close resemblance to a Kantian definition of autonomy; that is, autonomy stands 
opposed precisely to the norms that cannot be justified according to the 
individual’s own reason.189 If this is the case, perhaps Adorno takes ‘autonomy’ to 
denote a limited form of freedom; after all, given the importance of impulse, 
freedom understood as positive self-determination would require more than only 
the individual’s ability to justify norms by his use of reason. 
 
However, while it may be true that Adorno holds that the individual in 
contemporary society possesses some of the attributes that might be involved in 
the notion of autonomy, we should not thereby conclude that Adorno holds the 
ideal of autonomy to be something that is realisable under present circumstances. 
Rather, we are only accorded in theory an autonomy that has no bearing to actual 
moral practice; 
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‘The more freedom the subject…ascribes to itself, the greater its responsibility; 
and before this responsibility it must fail in a bourgeois life which in practice has 
never yet endowed a subject with the unabridged autonomy accorded to it in 
theory. Hence the subject must feel guilty.’190 
 
Thus, individuals are ascribed an autonomy that they in large part lack, which has 
the further consequence that they falsely view themselves as possessing moral 
responsibility. Yet, interestingly, this passage is equivocal in that it suggests that 
the individual has never obtained an unabridged autonomy. What this points to is 
the idea that autonomy might be something that is possessed in degrees, and that, 
while subjects have not yet been fully autonomous, this is not to say that 
autonomy is only a utopian ideal that is entirely unrealisable. Elements of what 
constitute autonomy – such as the possession of a critical self-consciousness –  
might manifest themselves in acts of resistance on the part of the subject, but it 
seems that something more would be required in order for the subject to be able to 
ascribe themselves the attribute of autonomy understood as positive freedom. 
 
What, then, would positive self-determination consist of? Firstly, it would go 
beyond the Kantian conception of autonomy as the ‘property the will has of being 
a law to itself (independently of every property belonging to the objects of 
volition)’191. For Kant, an autonomous will is a will that can act independently of 
the subject’s sensuous needs and inclinations by giving itself the law.  As was 
discussed in chapter two, the notion of the addendum suggests an alternative way 
of thinking about needs and inclinations such that they are not conceived of as 
sources of heteronomy, but rather as in some sense necessary for the self-
experience of freedom. In fact, it seems that something like autonomous living 
would only be possible if the ego and impulse became integrated with one another 
in a way that under present conditions is unachievable. Adorno terms the impulse 
the ‘addendum’ precisely because currently it is only experienced in addition to 
the theoretical consciousness. Autonomy might thus be a condition in which the 
impulse was not experienced as only additional, but rather as fully integrated with 
the ego. This seems to be borne out by suggestive comments made throughout 
Negative Dialectics. Thus, Adorno talks about the possibility of a self delivered 
from the ego and a subject whose liberation depends on the reconcilement of the I 
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with the not I.192 Actual autonomous living might further entail that drives would 
not to be ‘expressed in destruction.’193 Importantly, if this interpretation is right, it 
points to a clear distinction between autonomy as positive freedom and Adorno’s 
conception of negative freedom as resistance. While in the latter, the impulse is 
still regarded as the moment in which something additional is experienced to 
theoretical consciousness and the subject’s use of reason, fully autonomous action 
might not suffer this distinction and instead would involve an agency in which the 
diremption between theoretical consciousness and impulse did not exist. Yet this 
remains largely a reconstruction of how Adorno might begin to conceive of 
autonomous subjectivity, and one that is at risk of remaining somewhat utopian 
and flimsy. 
 
While little can be said about Adorno’s conception of autonomy as positive self-
determination, it is clear that – unlike negative freedom – it could not occur only 
on an individual level and would require radical social change. Adorno’s 
conception of autonomy – and his notion of a state of actual freedom –  is 
inextricably linked to economic factors; we lack autonomy in part because we lack 
economic self-determination; ‘life’ has become a ‘mere appendage of the process 
of material production’ that lacks either ‘autonomy’ or ‘substance’.194. Actual 
autonomous individuals would no longer assume a ‘role’, a concept that Adorno 
uses to denote the ‘bad, perverted depersonalisation of today’.195 Adorno thus 
holds there to be a distinction between the process of depersonalisation, in which 
subjects must rid themselves of their particularity in order to better assimilate 
themselves in an exchange society, and the liberation that would occur if the ego 
and impulse were to become integrated with one another.196 Adorno contends that, 
in modern societies, the term ‘role’ hints at the fact that ‘society is not identical 
with what [the people] are in themselves or what they could be.’197 But whilst the 
notion of a role points to the idea that the subject is assuming an identity that 
allows him to partake in the economic system of exchange from necessity, the role 
in fact ‘extends deep into the characteristics of people themselves…’198 Given the 
extent to which people have moulded themselves to keep afloat in capitalist 
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economies, it seems unlikely that they would have the requisite energy for 
anything like autonomous action. 
 
The idea that autonomy could only be achieved if the subject gained some form of 
economic self-determination is ostensibly obvious, yet the danger is that it is this 
aspect of Adorno’s treatment of freedom that is obscured when focusing on the 
potentialities of individual resistance in contemporary societies. Crucially, then, 
positive freedom in which the subject has the potential to be self-determining 
could only occur in a society that is economically structured in a radically different 
way. What is actually the case is that; 
 
‘The economic order…now…renders the majority of people dependent upon 
conditions beyond their control and thus maintains them in a state of political 
immaturity. If they want to live, then no other avenue remains but to adapt…to the 
given conditions; they must negate precisely their autonomous subjectivity…’199 
 
Importantly, later in the same passage Adorno states that ‘reality does not deliver 
autonomy’, which implies that the actual socio-historic conditions in which we 
find ourselves block autonomy understood as positive self-determination.200 
Autonomous subjectivity is thus not open to the individual because of the way in 
which he must comport himself and the roles that he must adopt in order to 
preserve himself within a capitalist economy. While the situation in which he finds 
himself just about leaves open the possibilities for the development of a theoretical 
self-consciousness, and thereby a negative form of freedom, his actual material 
dependency on the system of exchange prevents this from being accompanied by 
any positive self-determination. Autonomy would thus require a change in the 
subjective individual life that could only follow from a radical restructuring of 
society. Thus, it is the conditions in which we currently find ourselves that result 
in a conception of freedom as involving individual acts of resistance. A positive 
and more substantial view of free agency could only arise once there is radical 
social change. This in part shows that Adorno does not unreflectively arrive at an 
individualistic and abstracted conception of freedom that unproblematically grants 
a form of free agency to the individual without taking into account the need for 
social change.201 
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I will now examine several claims that Adorno makes that go some way in 
elucidating what would be required such that a more positive freedom would be 
possible, and how they might relate to the earlier discussion of the self-experience 
of freedom as impulse. The problem is that Adorno does not do much by way of 
explicating these claims, and because of their insubstantiality, relatively little has 
been said about them. It could be objected that, because Adorno himself does not 
attempt to arrive at a coherent theory of social freedom, his claims will inevitably 
be vague and unsatisfactory from the point of view of social theory. This is right, 
but in order for his account of free agency to be convincing, it is important to try 
to understand what they might mean and to establish a link between these claims 
and others that concern themselves with the individual self-experience of freedom. 
 
Firstly, Adorno holds that unimpaired freedom could only occur ‘under social 
conditions of unfettered plenty.’202 The basic idea is that under conditions in which 
resources are scarce and not everyone has enough either to subsist, or to 
comfortably subsist, positive self-determination is not possible. Instead there 
exists homo economicus, who must precisely adopt a role and therefore relinquish 
any remnants of an autonomous subjectivity in order that he is able to subsist 
under the conditions of capitalism. However, Adorno does not think that freedom 
would necessarily be achieved under conditions in which plenty obtained. Adorno 
holds the Marxian view that self-determination would further require that the 
process of production would be both ‘transparent’ to the subject and determined 
by him. Only then would the individual not be ‘passively buffeted by the ominous 
storms of life.'203  It thus becomes clear what Adorno means by the concrete 
possibilities of freedom; goods and production are material aspects of the world in 
which we find ourselves, and it is only in relation to them that something like 
freedom can be achieved. 
 
Interestingly, in his lecture ‘Transition to Moral Philosophy’, Adorno makes more 
explicit statements concerning the actual realisation of freedom. Firstly, he 
suggests that the possibilities of freedom are in fact growing.204 What is meant by 
this is that the actual historical conditions of contemporary society increasingly 
allow for the realisation of freedom in a way that was not the case in earlier 
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epochs. Yet, for Adorno, the fact that there is a greater possibility of the realisation 
of freedom does not correspond to the actual existence of freedom. In fact, the 
factors that might produce social freedom are those that also have the capacity to 
be used to make man more unfree. Adorno then goes on to make a highly 
significant claim; 
 
‘The concrete possibilities of making freedom a reality are to be sought – and I 
think this is a very important point – in the way in which we define the locus of 
freedom, namely, in the forces of production. By this I mean the state of human 
energies and the state of technology which represents an extension of human 
energies that have been multiplied through the growth of material production.’205 
 
He then goes on to state that; 
 
‘The potential for freedom …consists in the fact that the state of the forces of 
production today would in principle allow us in principle to free the world from 
want.’206 
 
The achievement of freedom, then, as a historical reality, depends on whatever 
Adorno means by ‘human energies’ and technology, understood as an outgrowth 
of these energies. If these two factors were arranged in the right kind of way, 
individuals would no longer want, which, Adorno holds would lead, if not to a 
state of complete freedom, at least to an ‘imperfect’ freedom.207 The idea is that, 
oppression exists in societies in part because individuals have no choice but to 
involve themselves in the structures of society if they are to be provided with the 
kind of material resources that they require in order to maintain themselves. A 
society in which individuals no longer materially wanted for things would 
eventually signify the end of the need by the individual to adapt themselves to 
oppressive structures and point to the emergence of a positive freedom in which 
they were able to be self-determining. 
 
Ostensibly, this account of the possibilities of the actual realisation might strike us 
as an extremely reductive depiction of what would have to occur in order for there 
to be social freedom compared to the complexity of traditional Marxist accounts of 
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the conditions under which societal emancipation could be achieved.  
Furthermore, it seems largely unrelated to Adorno’s more specific arguments 
concerning what constitutes the self-experience of both freedom and morality in a 
problematical way. It could be objected that these sorts of passages – and the 
claims discussed earlier that alluded to production and scarcity – leave Adorno 
open to the charge that he arrives at a radically negative assessment of freedom as 
it exists in contemporary society, that is coupled with a simplistic and utopian 
account of the possibilities of freedom. To meet this type of objection on Adorno’s 
behalf, I will examine the claims in greater detail, and suggest a way of construing 
them such that the connection between the possibilities of freedom and his 
treatment of freedom discussed in earlier chapters becomes clearer. 
 
II: The Locus of Freedom 
 
What is the significance of in part locating the possibility of freedom in 
technology? Firstly, it demonstrates the extent to which Adorno holds freedom to 
be something that requires change in the actual empirical world, and secondly, like 
both Hegel and Marx, something that can be achieved in the process of historical 
development. As was discussed in chapter two, it is only at a certain point in 
human development that the idea of freedom arises. Furthermore, like Hegel and 
Marx, Adorno also holds that it is only when certain conditions are in place is it 
possible that freedom can actually be realised. Unlike Hegel and Marx, however, 
he holds that history does not constitute a march to progress, and is often 
irrational.208 Thus, technical developments could be the source of our liberation 
but equally could be the source of an even greater unfreedom. 
 
Importantly, in contemporary society, technology has made self-preservation 
‘easy’209.  Adorno holds that technical development has reached a point at which it 
would be possible for humans to cease to labour as extensively as is still required 
of them by society. It is useful to here turn to Marcuse, whose clear delineation of 
the relation between technology and autonomy seems to be close to Adorno’s own 
contention. Like Adorno, Marcuse suggests that technology has the potential to 
signal a newly found autonomy in contemporary society; he argues that currently 
an insubstantial individual autonomy is only found in the realm of production. He 
then claims that technology tends to ‘eliminate individual autonomy’ in these 
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areas, with the result that the ‘force’ of this autonomy could be ‘released in a yet 
uncharted realm of freedom beyond that of necessity.’210 Like Adorno, Marcuse 
think that, so far, the circumscribed freedom that we possess has been limited to 
the freedom required of the individual in order that he is able to partake in a 
capitalist system of exchange as a labouring, economic subject211 Technology 
could signal the end of this pernicious freedom, and instead point to an actual 
autonomy in which the individual no longer had to expend his time and energies in 
modes of production and could instead determine these processes. Marcuse also 
suggests that, in contemporary society the opposite tends to be true; that is, that 
‘the apparatus imposes its economic and political requirements…on the labour 
time and free time of man, on the material and on the intellectual culture.’212 Yet 
Adorno’s prognosis seems to be bleaker than Marcuses’. Technology not only 
increases our unfreedom and potentialities for brutality213, but it is difficult to 
envisage a world in which this relation could somehow be reversed given that 
technologies develop independently of their use value, and come to themselves be 
autonomous.214 In fact, Adorno suggests that, for the most part, technology raises 
the standard of living whilst cutting off the possibility of actual fulfilment.215 
 
Given the latter claim, we should not take Adorno’s contention that the locus of 
freedom lies in the forces of production to mean that, in order to be instantiated, 
freedom requires only that human energies and technology to be at a certain level, 
which, if reached would allow for societal and therefore individual freedom. As 
we have seen in chapter two, it is one of Adorno’s chief arguments that human 
energies are often misdirected and serve only to reinforce unfreedom, rather than 
be the source of liberation. Adorno’s argument is that human energies and 
technical development in modern society could in theory prevent everyone 
suffering from privation or want, which, being achieved could then lead to a kind 
of freedom. However, Adorno also holds the Marxian view that it is the relations 
of production in capitalist society that block this. In an earlier lecture he states 
that, the fact that millions of individuals still suffer from hunger is the result of the 
‘forms of social production…not the intrinsic difficulty of meeting people’s 
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material needs.’216 Thus, it is the irrational structure of society – not its actual 
technical and material capabilities – that blocks freedom and maintains the 
individual under a repressive system.217 It is only by changing this irrational 
structure that we can hope to effectuate anything that might lead to the realisation 
of freedom. One question that arises from this, is, given the unfreedom of the 
individual explored in chapter two, how could anyone begin to have the 
appropriate energies to begin to remedy the situation? It seems that negative 
freedom understood as resistance would not be sufficient to achieve anything like 
the kind of radical overhaul required for the instantiation of even an imperfect 
freedom. 
 
 
 
Freedom, Want, Impulse 
 
So far, it has been established that Adorno does offer a way in which we might 
begin to think of the social changes necessary for a state of [imperfect] freedom to 
be reached. Unlike in the discussion of the addendum in which freedom is 
discussed with reference to the interplay between the ego and impulse, the claim 
that the locus of freedom resides in the productive forces of a society shifts the 
grounds of the discussion. The question, then, is how to bridge the gap between 
Adorno’s conception of individual freedom in his discussion of the addendum, and 
his account of the social conditions under which freedom can be achieved? 
 
After a brief discussion of the fact that the forces of production could eliminate 
want, Adorno states; 
 
‘…If want could be banished, all the instruments of oppression would come to 
appear superfluous, to the point where the machinery of oppression would be 
unable to survive in the long run. This process would ultimately extend to the 
unfreedom of human beings, in other words, to their so-called adaptation to their 
social situation, in the absence of want they would no longer need to conform.’218 
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Importantly, Adorno suggests that freedom would require the absence of want, 
rather than the absence of need. The implication is that mere survival is thus not 
enough for there to be freedom, and individuals must be above the material level 
required for only self-preservation. It is unclear whether or not Adorno uses ‘want’ 
to refer only to material things, or whether it might also refer to psychic processes. 
One question that arises is how, in a radically false world in which individuals are 
for the most part deceived about the society in which they find themselves, we 
could ever hope to identify instances of want, in both ourselves and others. Want 
might be more difficult and less obvious to identify than need. Instead, as a result 
of the prevailing false consciousness, we might pick up on the wrong kinds of 
want. Thus, it is possible to envisage individuals wanting for a new technological 
device, and even to an extent ‘suffering’, because they were unable to obtain it for 
whatever reason. Yet this kind of scenario is clearly not the kind of want that 
Adorno has in mind. How, then, could we understand ‘want’ such that it does not 
involve a response to these kinds of situation, and instead is focused on the right 
kind of deprivations, that, if eliminated might then lead to something resembling 
freedom? 
 
One way in which we might be able to begin to appropriately identify and respond 
to instances of want that should be eliminated would be precisely by the 
development of the right kind of theoretical self-consciousness. Such a critical 
consciousness would be capable of discerning instances of want that would require 
attention from those that would not. Further, we could say certain instances of 
want would elicit within us the experience of the additional factor that would then 
move us to action. What this points to is the fact that Adorno can claim both that 
we live in a radically false society in which we are often deceived about sources of 
suffering, whilst still allowing for the correct identification of instances of want, 
given the earlier discussion of impulse and negative freedom. However, even if it 
is the case that it is possible to identify the types of ‘want’ that should be 
responded to and eliminated, what remains unclear is that actual relation that holds 
between wanting and freedom. In fact, we could object that it is perfectly 
conceivable that, in a hypothetical society in which no one wanted for anything, 
there could still exist a state of complete unfreedom in which individuals and 
society as a whole existed under oppressive structures. 
 
This objection can be met on Adorno’s behalf. Firstly, while the elimination of 
want would be necessary in order to remove the sources of oppression and 
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repression, Adorno would not hold this to be sufficient for the realisation of 
freedom, but rather the first step in a process. The point for Adorno is that the 
absence of want would mean that individuals would no longer be required to adapt 
or conform in order to procure the material necessary for existence. Currently, 
individuals have to both ‘prove themselves through the work ethic’ and display 
‘independence, autonomy and initiative’, and yet simultaneously mutilate 
themselves through the process of adaptation.219 As we saw in chapter two, the 
independence and autonomy required of the individual as economic and rational 
subject is contradicted by the fact that the individual is dependent on the system 
for his self-preservation, and thus neither independent nor autonomous. Thus, 
Adorno’s point is not that the absence of want would itself spell the end of the 
individual’s repression, but rather that it would allow the subject to cease to take 
on the ‘role’ and undergo the multiplicity of humiliations prevalent in late 
capitalist societies, and instead perhaps be in the position to become a self that 
would not be ‘locked up in its identity.’220 
 
Adorno’s idea that the absence of want might spell the end of the need for the 
individual to conform could be construed as a somewhat utopian, even naïve 
suggestion. In fact, it leads to a concern that resembles an objection that was raised 
briefly in the second chapter. That is, that perhaps, to an extent at least, some level 
of conformity in a complex society is necessary, just as some control over the 
impulses must be exercised. It could then be argued that, by suggesting the a state 
of freedom would be one in which no one had any need to adapt to societal 
mechanisms, Adorno ignores the extent to which some adaptation through 
conforming could be viewed as necessary and even in part beneficial on the part of 
the subject. We might wish to distinguish between modes of conforming and 
adaptation that are necessary for the continuation of life and even positive, and 
modes that serve only to coerce the individuals.  
 
However, in Adorno’s defence, he does not think that an absence of conformity is 
in itself an intrinsically valuable phenomenon. After all, he claims that ‘Society is 
in the wrong against the individual in its general claims, but it is also in the right 
against him, since the social principle of unreflected self-preservation…is 
hypostasized in the individual.’221 While the right kind of non-conformity could 
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potentially be a source of liberation because it would free up the constrained ego 
and allow for the expression of impulses that are suppressed in a society in which 
we have no control over the powers of production, historically nothing resembling 
this kind of state has been achieved, and currently the individual is a ‘microcosmic 
copy’ of the social mechanism. 
 
Given this latter point, one can perhaps start to question whether a state of freedom 
could ever be realised given that Adorno thinks that modern individuals are 
becoming increasingly identical with their roles. It appears that we are left at an 
impasse, in which society cannot be free because the individual does not have the 
requisite energies to bring about the necessary changes, and, without the freeing 
up of society as a whole, the individual cannot hope to have these energies. But 
this again highlights the importance of the negative freedom that we can exercise 
through resistance. The individual may not currently possess the kinds of energies 
required to signal a real, positive freedom of self-determination, but there is some 
room for change if he can hold fast to his critical consciousness and also the 
possibility discussed earlier of spontaneous action in the face of those situations 
that require of us an immediate response. This may not itself be enough for the 
radical social overhaul that is required for true freedom, but it points to a way in 
which we might begin to effectuate change in society. 
 
However, throughout my examination of Adorno’s conception of freedom, I have 
repeatedly pointed to the fundamental role that Adorno accords to the cultivation 
of critical consciousness in the exercise of negative freedom. Yet the danger is that  
continual appeals to ‘critical consciousness’ and ‘education’ come to themselves 
possess a somewhat formal and empty aspect, devoid of any concrete 
philosophical significance. Of course, it could be argued that Adorno envisages 
critical consciousness to be one possessed by individuals capable of critical theory, 
and thus able to undertake immanent forms of critique or negative dialectics. But it 
seems that this must be elaborated further if it is really to be viewed as the source 
of [negative] freedom. The same is true of Adorno’s appeal to education. 
Examples of what he envisages such an education to consist in are provided; he 
suggests that children are to be shown television programmes and then questioned 
in such a way as to bring them to consciousness of what the intentions of the 
programmes might be.222 But, as O’Connor points out, Adorno’s idea that the 
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objective of a rational society is a community of autonomous individuals is never 
examined in a philosophically substantial way, and remains separate from his 
more theoretical examinations of freedom.223 This points to a gap in Adorno’s 
account of freedom. That is, he rather uncritically conceives of a society in which 
want would be eliminated as one in which individuals could be free from the need 
to adapt and conform. Yet rather than saying anything further about how this 
might relate to freedom as it stands, we are left to formulate tenuous links between 
earlier discussions of impulse, and how these impulses might express themselves 
differently in a free society. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
What, then, should be concluded about Adorno’s account of freedom? Firstly, I 
argued that Adorno’s own treatment of freedom must be sensitive to the shifting 
forms freedom takes given his contention that freedom both as an idea and the 
thing itself is historical. It is quite clear that Adorno’s treatment of freedom is 
inextricably tied to historical considerations throughout. Thus, an ethics of 
resistance – in which we can exercise our negative freedom – must change 
according to the shifting forms of heteronomy imposed on the individual subject. 
Equally, Adorno holds that something resembling a more positive freedom can 
only be achieved by the removal of want, which depends on human energies and 
the state of technology. This entails that the grounds of freedom are located in the 
forces of production, which themselves depend on the historical conditions of a 
given society. However, importantly, unlike Hegel and Marx, Adorno does not 
view the march of history as inherently progressive, and there is thus no necessary 
connection between historical developments and the attainment of freedom. 
Rather, while the possibilities of freedom grow with increasing technical 
advancement, technology has in fact made us more unfree. Adorno’s analysis of 
the historical nature of freedom has potentially progressive implications: freedom 
is not regarded as a timeless, abstract quality that we possess by virtue of our 
rationality, and it is rather something that depends for its realisation on actual 
socio-historic and economic conditions.  But nor is freedom something that is 
necessarily achieved through history; rather, it is conceived of as a fragile 
possibility that is always in danger of turning into its opposite; that is, unfreedom 
and repression. 
 
Secondly, I suggested in the first chapter, that, Adorno must propose a coherent 
account of willing in which he showed that willing requires something other than 
only consciousness or reason. Thus, a great deal rests on the extent to which the 
‘additional factor’ is found to be a convincing alternative to a purely rational will. 
I argue that the addendum does point to a new way of thinking about freedom and 
our relation to the world. Thus, what is regarded as heteronomous in Kant 
becomes something that is conceived of as in some way necessary for any self-
experience of freedom. This would suggest that free agency would necessarily 
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involve a novel relation to our corporeality and impulses that would entail a sense 
of our dependency on nature. I suggested that one possible problem for Adorno’s 
account is the way in which Adorno conceives of the impulse – and therefore, of 
freedom – as being something that is both immediate whilst being more than only 
reflexive. We might well ask, given the extent to which we are victims of false 
consciousness, how any such spontaneous willing is possible. I suggested that 
Adorno does think that some immediacy remains open to the subject, and it is 
precisely the physical aspect of the impulse in which immediacy could manifest 
itself. Further, unlike reflexive actions, the impulse is not identical only to 
physical responsiveness, but requires the interplay between impulse and 
theoretical consciousness. 
 
However, several problems remain with Adorno’s notion of the additional factor. 
Firstly, while we might accept that certain impulses might be necessary for the 
experience of freedom, we might also wish to claim that the experience of other 
impulses would rather be the source of unfreedom. Yet Adorno does not 
distinguish between different types of impulse. One response is to turn to the idea 
that the self-experience of freedom would in large part depend on the interaction 
between impulses and a highly developed theoretical consciousness. Yet, as I 
pointed out in chapter four, the notion of a theoretical consciousness itself remains 
a crucial and yet relatively philosophically insubstantial and undeveloped concept 
in Adorno’s work. Secondly, I claimed that Adorno unconvincingly arrives at a 
dichotomous characterisation of the interplay between ego and impulse, in which 
the former is viewed as something that is necessarily coercive. Yet, we might hold 
that more nuance is required in arriving at a characterisation of the ego that does 
not omit its potential for acting non-coercively. What this points to is that Adorno 
is himself guilty of treating nature and reason as if they are opposed to one 
another. He would respond that, under current conditions, we cannot help but 
experience them as a dichotomy. But we might perhaps argue that, in fact, even 
under present conditions that the perceived diremption is less clear than Adorno 
suggests. A final problem raised in my examination of Adorno’s account of 
willing is that it is not immediately apparent how the addendum relates either to 
the moral addendum discussed at a later point in Negative Dialectics, or how it 
relates to a concern with social freedom more generally. 
 
Ostensibly, the relation between the somatic experience of freedom and of moral 
impulse is clear. Both, after all, require a physical moment that is somehow 
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mediated by theoretical consciousness. However, there are two questions that 
arise. Firstly, can anything more be said about the relation that holds between the 
two beyond this? Secondly, might the experience of impulse be more 
problematical when it comes to discussing questions of morality than in 
contemplating lone instances of the self-experience of freedom? I suggested that 
both the self-experience of freedom and the moral require an openness to 
externality that requires mimesis on the part of the subject. Importantly, Adorno 
re-interprets Kantian spontaneity to point to the duality necessary for the right kind 
of response that would be both free, and allow the individual to experience the 
moral in the appropriate way. We can then understand how it is that Adorno 
envisages a negative freedom to manifest itself in contemporary society; through 
spontaneous actions that comprise acts of resistance on the part of the subject 
against existent forms of heteronomy. Yet the idea that Adorno arrives at an 
‘ethics of resistance’ often glosses over what is problematical about such a 
conception of the relation between freedom and moral action. Thus, Adorno seems 
to require of the individual an autonomy that he does not in fact possess to be able 
even to partake in resistance. Secondly, we might question the individualistic 
nature of such a conception of freedom. Thus, while the individual is negatively 
free in his resistance to societal forms of heteronomy, such an account occludes 
any possibility of grounding freedom in any form of sociality. It is not surprising 
given Adorno’s mistrust both of solidarity movements and existent forms of 
collectivism, but we might wish that Adorno’s focus on resistance was oriented to 
some degree by the possible social forms negative freedom could take. 
 
This last objection could in part be met by an examination of Adorno’s conception 
of autonomy, which shows clearly that positive self-determination can only be 
achieved by a wider societal emancipation. While Adorno sometimes confusingly 
claims that autonomy is in part realisable even under present conditions, in order 
to be positively self-determining, there would have to be a change in the actual 
empirical and economic conditions in society.  However, Adorno’s account of the 
conditions under which a societal freedom could take place can be construed as 
utopian and philosophically flimsy. While this is wholly intentional on Adorno’s 
part given that he thinks that little else can be said from our present perspective, 
this does not exempt him from the task of at least pointing to a way in which we 
can begin to think about societal emancipation. Adorno does in fact make some 
remarks concerning the objective changes that would have to take place such that 
an imperfect freedom could hold. Thus, he situates the locus of freedom in the 
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forces of production, by which he means both the state of human energies and 
technology. Both could potentially allow for the elimination of ‘want’, which 
would in turn signify the end of the individual’s assumption of the role in 
contemporary society. The suggestion is that, if the individual is both materially 
secure and capable of determining processes of production, this might allow for 
the formation of a new kind of identity. Such an account is deeply speculative, and 
in order to be fully plausible, it would require theoretical development that is not 
possible given our entrenchment in present conditions. But while this is true, we 
might still query the extent to which Adorno rather unproblematically connects the 
removal of want with the achievement of freedom. However, I suggested that the 
removal of want would be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
realisation of freedom. Yet, while this is true, more needs to be done in order to 
substantiate the notion of ‘want’. There is an extensive philosophical literature on 
the subject of what constitutes both material want and need, and it is a shame that 
Adorno does not himself adequately broach the question. His statement could 
perhaps be viewed as having a suggestive function, yet given the complexity of 
existing empirical conditions, we might remain dissatisfied with such a summation 
of the changes necessary for imperfect freedom. 
 
However, while we might find Adorno’s claims concerning a wider societal 
emancipation to be lacking, this is wholly in keeping with the negativism of his 
thought in general. Yet, as I have sought to show in this work, Adorno’s 
pessimistic views concerning the conditions of contemporary society do not 
preclude Adorno from also suggesting a new way in which we can think about 
freedom. The point for Adorno is that we must begin by altering the way in which 
we conceive of freedom in the first place by taking in to account those elements of 
our experience that theories of freedom have tended to ignore. But crucial to 
Adorno’s account is that freedom necessarily has a material basis in existing 
conditions, and as such, it cannot be realised only by the solitary subject’s attitude 
towards his self.. 
 
Finally, one of the most important aspects of Adorno’s treatment of the idea of 
freedom is to point out the limitations of the idea itself. By this I mean, firstly, 
Adorno’s contention that, in modern society, the concept of freedom is often 
invoked on ideological grounds, and unquestioningly assumed to correspond to a 
reality that is not in fact present. One of Adorno’s strengths is to point out that the 
idea of freedom is deployed and misused in numerous contexts, and comes to be 
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both meaningless and – in some cases – a legitimisation of existing forms of 
unfreedom. But secondly, by referring to something over and above freedom -–
that is, reconciliation – he suggests that the idea of freedom must not be 
hypostasised. Rather, it is something that should be aimed for and is currently 
precluded by current societal conditions, but simultaneously, the notion of 
freedom itself is historical, and as such the product of imperfect forms of sociality. 
While little can be said about how Adorno conceives of reconciliation, or whether 
or not such an idea is feasible or philosophically justifiable, it does point to the 
fact that we should not regard freedom to be an ‘ideal hovering inalienably and 
immutably above the heads of human beings.’224  
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